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The issue of missiles in all its aspects

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report was prepared by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research with the support of qualified consultants pursuant to General Assembly resolution 59/67 to address the issue of missiles in all its aspects. It describes the background and current situation in the field of missiles and identifies the areas of existing consensus as well as those areas where consensus can be reached.

The report concludes that States acknowledge that reaching consensus on all aspects of the issue of missiles cannot be accomplished in a single step. However, most States agree that the existing situation is unsatisfactory and that arms control and disarmament measures on missiles are presently unattainable. On this basis, the report recommends that the United Nations address the substantive content and appropriateness of missile-specific confidence-building measures at the national, bilateral, regional and international levels. The second area of possible consensus builds upon the existing agreement on the control of man-portable air defence systems. The report recommends the consolidation of efforts to control man-portable air defence systems under the aegis of the United Nations, with a view to enhancing the controls and assistance elements identified in General Assembly resolution 60/77 and broadening support for current international, regional and national efforts to combat and prevent the illicit transfer of man-portable air defence systems.

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I. Introduction

1. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 55/33 A of 20 November 2000, a Panel of Governmental Experts was established in 2002 to assist the Secretary-General in the preparation of a report on the issue of missiles in all its aspects. The report (A/57/229), which was the first effort by the United Nations to address the issue of missiles in all its aspects, was welcomed by the General Assembly in its resolutions 57/71 of 22 November 2002 and 58/37 of 8 December 2003.

2. By resolution 58/37, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a Panel of Governmental Experts to be established in 2004 on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, to explore further the issue of missiles in all its aspects and to submit a report for consideration by the Assembly at its fifty-ninth session. This second Panel held a comprehensive, in-depth exchange of views on the issue of missiles in all its aspects. By the end of its work in July 2004, and given the complexity of the issues at hand, no consensus was reached on a report by the Panel.

3. The present report responds to General Assembly resolution 59/67 of 17 December 2004, by which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report, with the support of qualified consultants and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, as appropriate, taking into account the views expressed by Member States, to contribute to the United Nations endeavour to address the issue of missiles in all its aspects by identifying areas where consensus could be reached, and to submit it to the Assembly at its sixty-first session.

4. By the same resolution, the Assembly also requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a Panel of Governmental Experts to be established in 2007 on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, to further explore further ways and means to address within the United Nations the issue of missiles in all its aspects, including identifying areas where consensus could be reached, and to submit a report for consideration by the Assembly at its sixty-third session.

5. In preparing the present report, the consultant and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research held comprehensive informal consultations and undertook thorough research on the full range of open sources covering technical, strategic, political and arms control and disarmament aspects of missile-related issues in 2005-2006. The conclusion is that despite the complex and sensitive nature of missile issues, areas of consensus either exist or are within reach, and can form the basis for further missile-related efforts in the framework of the United Nations.

II. Understanding the lack of consensus on the issue of missiles in all its aspects

6. The two panels of governmental experts convened by the United Nations in 2002 and 2004 were unique opportunities to gauge the current existence and future likelihood of consensus on the issue of missiles in all its aspects. There is no other forum where experts from States with extremely diverse perspectives can engage in comprehensive and thorough discussion of these issues, with the explicit objective of reaching consensus on the issue of missiles in all its aspects.

7. The first panel produced a comprehensively factual report, primarily describing and explaining the current situation and its background, including the technical characteristics of ballistic, cruise and other missiles and the various international instruments set up to address them. While it did not succeed in reaching consensus on substantive conclusions, even less so recommendations, it did prepare the ground for further deliberations on the issue.

8. The second panel was unable to build on the work of its predecessor. This strongly suggested that while States can agree on the current reality, they are unable to agree on what to do about it. Furthermore, a central challenge for the second panel was that it was tasked to explore further exactly the same issues as those addressed by the first panel. The all-encompassing nature of the mandate to address the issue of missiles in all its aspects prevented the second panel from adopting a report reflecting those areas where agreement existed or was within reach.

9. The second panel's inability to agree on a report further confirmed, under current and foreseeable circumstances, a consensus on all aspects of the issue of missiles is unlikely to be reached. Indeed, the experience of both panels clearly indicates that there exist substantial disagreements on central issues pertaining to matters of priority, comprehensiveness and universality. Should missiles be addressed in themselves or purely as delivery vehicles for weapons of mass destruction (priority)? Which categories of missiles from among an extraordinarily diverse spectrum from shoulder-fired rockets to intercontinental ballistic missiles, should be addressed (comprehensiveness)? Should arrangements necessarily involve the entire international community or only some States (universality)?

10. Particularly sensitive and contentious issues divide, inter alia:

- States that support active ballistic missile defences from States that oppose them
- States primarily concerned with ballistic missiles capable of weapons of mass destruction roles from States primarily concerned with cruise missiles in conventional or nuclear mode
- States which favour gradual step-by-step approaches to address missile-related issues from States which consider comprehensiveness and universality as sine qua non
- States that regard the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Hague Code of Conduct as promising building blocks from States that consider these and other arrangements as inherently flawed for reasons of substantive comprehensiveness and/or political inclusiveness
- States that are receptive from others that are less so, or averse, to missile-related transparency measures
- States that consider as absolute the right to space-launch capabilities for peaceful purposes from others that regard this right as qualified and conditional

A. Shifting priorities, scope and methods in addressing missile-related issues in the United Nations context

11. There is an emerging tendency to perceive missiles as intrinsically important regardless of how they are armed. From this perspective, a missile can be of great significance even if armed with conventional explosives or not armed at all, relying exclusively on kinetic energy to achieve destruction. Another tendency has become apparent where an increasing number of States are involved in missile-related diplomacy, an area that was largely addressed in a bilateral context until the late 1980s. In parallel, there is a tendency to attempt to devise approaches and measures applicable to an increasing variety of missiles, such as man-portable air defence systems, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles.

12. The three issues of priority, comprehensiveness and universality have complicated consideration by the United Nations of the issue of missiles for five decades. No universal norm, treaty or agreement governing the development, testing, production, acquisition, transfer, deployment or use of missiles exists. The treatment of missile-related issues in the United Nations has tended to fluctuate between approaches characterized by comprehensiveness and those characterized by selectivity, as evident in the following survey of relevant documents.

B. Missiles as delivery vehicles?

13. Initially, missile issues were addressed exclusively by inference, as part of the efforts to address nuclear priorities. Only gradually over the years has their treatment become more explicit.

14. In the beginning, missiles were seen not as a distinct priority but as part of broad mandates covering all aspects of disarmament. In one of the first efforts to articulate a comprehensive approach to disarmament challenges, the General Assembly established a basic distinction between nuclear weapons and all other weapons. General Assembly resolution 808 (IX), of 4 November 1954, reflects confusion over missiles, which can be used — and were designed from the start — for both nuclear and conventional roles. To many observers, it seemed as if missiles were essentially part of nuclear weapon systems, but it was their use in delivering conventional weapons that developed most rapidly.

15. The launch on 4 October 1957 of Sputnik, a satellite placed in orbit by a rocket with unambiguous intercontinental capability, elicited many proposals for restraint. In the General Assembly, this took the form of an indirect response, implicit in a new call for "measures against the possibility of surprise attack" (resolution 1252 (XIII) of 4 November 1958). Once again, missiles were not emphasized per se.

16. The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2 of 30 June 1978) situates missiles as elements of the nuclear arms race and focuses on their role as nuclear delivery vehicles.

17. Security Council resolution 687 (1991) makes an explicit link between missiles and weapons of mass destruction when it refers to "the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery ...".

18. Security Council resolution 707 (1991) refers to "programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles" and "material or equipment relating to [Iraq's] nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or ballistic missile programmes". This phrase can be interpreted either to mean that ballistic missiles were understood as a component in weapon systems armed with weapons of mass destruction, or that ballistic missiles were of equal and separate importance.

19. Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) affirms that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery to non-State actors, constitutes a threat to international peace and security. For the purposes of the resolution only, means of delivery are defined as "missiles, rockets and other unmanned systems capable of delivering nuclear, chemical or biological weapons that are specifically designed for such use".

C. Which missiles?

20. While the United Nations began by considering missiles merely as delivery systems, by the 1990s it had become increasingly common for various categories of missiles to become a focus of attention in themselves.

21. One indication of this new focus was the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms established in 1992, a voluntary register for international arms transfers. It covers, inter alia, "guided and unguided rockets, ballistic missiles and cruise missiles capable of delivering a warhead or weapon of destruction to a range of at least 25 kilometres", reflecting the shift in the 1990s towards covering most types of missiles, both conventional and non-conventional.

22. Among the categories of missiles considered by the United Nations for particular attention were the following.

Ballistic missiles

23. In the late 1990s, while the United Nations broadened the objects of discussion by emphasizing missiles in general, it also narrowed deliberations to additional specific categories. For instance, the General Assembly called for the preservation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, asking the United States and the Russian Federation to constrain their missile defence deployments to fit treaty limitations.

24. By its resolution 59/91, of 3 December 2004, the General Assembly welcomed the adoption of the Hague Code of Conduct and invited all States that had not yet done so to subscribe to it. The resolution was approved by a recorded vote of 137 in favour to 2 against, with 16 abstentions. The resolution emphasized the significance of regional and international efforts to prevent and curb comprehensively the proliferation of ballistic missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. With 120 subscribing States to date, the Hague Code of Conduct is the first international instrument with a stated vocation to universality, which singles out ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction as an object of international concern.

Cruise missiles

25. One of the sharpest debates over the comprehensiveness of scope focuses on the question of including cruise missiles in international deliberations, negotiations

and measures. Technically, cruise missiles are able to perform many of the same military missions as ballistic missiles. They have been used much more widely than ballistic missiles in military interventions since the end of the cold war. Although the cruise missiles used in conflicts to date have carried conventional high explosives, they have clear weapons of mass destruction capabilities. The customary understanding, associating ballistic missiles with weapons of mass destruction and cruise missiles with conventional warheads, appears to be breaking down. Technical trends are creating greater interest in conventionally armed long-range ballistic missiles, while more military forces acquire cruise missiles.

26. In the United Nations context, cruise missiles have received some attention since the end of the cold war, particularly in the Register of Conventional Arms, the report of the first Panel of Governmental Experts (A/57/229) and the Security Council resolutions related to the destruction of Iraq's missile capabilities.

Man-portable air defence systems

27. Since 2002, man-portable air defence systems have become a subject of increasing international attention, including in the United Nations. The report of the Secretary-General, *In larger freedom* (A/59/2005, para. 101), puts man-portable air defence system and ballistic missiles on an equal footing among missile-related security challenges:

> The availability of ballistic missiles with extended range and greater accuracy is of growing concern to many States, as is the spread of shoulder-fired missiles which could be used by terrorists. Member States should adopt effective national export controls covering missiles and other means of delivery for nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, rockets and shoulder-fired missiles, as well as a ban on transferring any of them to non-State actors. The Security Council should also consider adopting a resolution aimed at making it harder for terrorists to acquire or use shoulder-fired missiles.

28. In 2003, the Register of Conventional Arms was amended to add provisions for reporting transfers of man-portable air defence systems. Reporting under the Register remains completely voluntary, but participation has expanded over the years to include most Member States.

29. General Assembly resolution 60/77 of 8 December 2005 calls for international, regional and national efforts to combat and prevent the illicit use of man-portable air defence systems and unauthorized access to and use of such weapons. This resolution, covering one specific type of missile system, is unique in two ways. First, it was adopted by consensus, an unusual occurrence in the missile area. Second, and illustrating once again the diversity and complexity of missile issues, the resolution refers not to any existing missile-related agreement, but to the Programme of Action on Small Arms (A/CONF.192/15, chap. IV, para. 24).

30. Of three categories of missile systems — ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and man-portable air defence systems — the latter is the one whose treatment in the international community is the most recent, but also the most advanced. There exist rigorous measures stipulated by the Wassenaar Arrangement's participating States and later adopted in almost identical form by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as a number of other relevant regional initiatives, whose observance could be broadened as widely as international consensus and its

evolution allows. Symmetrically, the universal consensus expressed by General Assembly resolution 60/77 could be deepened to encompass as many specific measures as possible.

D. Universality or segmentation?

31. With reference to missile issues, observance of the norm of universality in the United Nations has fluctuated on occasion, with resort to some segmentation and singularizing of specific States.

32. This appeared initially with expressions by the General Assembly of support and encouragement for bilateral nuclear arms control and its implications for some missiles. The 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), eliminating the intermediate-range and shorter-range ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles of the United States of America and the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, was thus welcomed by the General Assembly.

33. Segmentation also occurred with expressions of concern about the missile-related activities, in particular ballistic missile programmes, of Israel and South Africa in the 1980s.

34. The strongest action against any single country related to missiles was contained in Security Council resolution 687 (1991), which stipulated that "Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of ... (a)ll ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production facilities".

35. Apart from the above-mentioned instances of focus on specific countries, the General Assembly has generally resorted to approaches stressing the importance of missiles in themselves, addressing all missiles comprehensively and seeking universal participation. The Assembly's resolution of 1999 on missiles (resolution 54/54 F of 15 December 1999) and its resolution of 2000 calling for the creation of a Panel of Governmental Experts (resolution 55/33 A of 20 November 2000), instead of emphasizing particular kinds of missile technology or the missile activities of specific countries, endorsed comprehensive themes consistent with the spirit of previous resolutions in the field of arms control and disarmament. This trend is also evident in the resolution calling for the present report.

III. Proposals for missile control and disarmament

A. Experts' proposals for missile controls and missile disarmament

36. Amid the international community's difficulties in making progress on missile-related issues, a number of arms control experts have made proposals of direct relevance to the subject at hand. While certain areas for action are more promising than others, ambitious proposals deserve serious consideration regardless of the immediate prospects. In an international environment where responses to the global spread of missile technology include not just arms races and defences, but pre-emptive attack and preventive warfare, consideration of broad mechanisms for

missile restraint is vital. Among the most important kinds of restraint measures proposed in recent years are the following.

Proposals for zero ballistic missiles

37. The outright prohibition of a particular type of weapon remains the most thorough, ambitious and effective of all disarmament measures. After being considered by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States at the 1986 Reykjavik summit, the idea of banning all ballistic missiles has received regular consideration by disarmament specialists. In the specialized literature, these proposals usually involve missile disarmament in successive, cumulative phases, and stress the aim of seeking both global and regional stability in a non-discriminatory way. Such legally binding and universal agreements are also put forward with the aim of avoiding races between offensive missiles and missile defences, as well as the cost of the latter.

Proposals for banning missiles of specific ranges

38. Rather than eliminate all ballistic missiles, less ambitious agreements targeting missile systems believed to be especially dangerous to regional and international stability have also been proposed. The only such agreement in existence is the 1987 INF Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States, which eliminated ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 kilometres to 5,500 kilometres. In the specialized literature a number of proposals have been made for new agreements following the INF Treaty model, whether on a global or regional scale, while acknowledging the difficulties involved.

39. Other categories of missiles which might be considered for prohibition and elimination include intercontinental ballistic missiles, intermediate-range ballistic missiles, all missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction and man-portable air defence systems. As shown by prior practices in the United Nations, outlined above, virtually any type of weapon technology can be isolated for elimination. The foremost negotiated example is the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Start II Treaty), which provided for the elimination of multiple-warhead intercontinental ballistic missile launchers and of heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles, although it never entered into force.

40. Cruise missiles, especially conventionally armed cruise missiles, have not been singled out for missile bans or quantitative restrictions, other than implicitly in the context of some proposals for agreements following the pattern of the INF Treaty. Existing suggestions confine themselves to less ambitious measures, such as the introduction of cruise missiles into the purview of the Hague Code of Conduct, and strengthening the relevant provisions of the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Controlling deployment and modernization

41. The established precedents in the missile field involve not universal bans but bilateral limits on the number and types of missiles that States maintain. The three fully ratified Soviet-American and Russo-American strategic weapons treaties (the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Start I Treaty and the Moscow Treaty) all emphasize limits on deployment and modernization. These agreements were based on the premise that the outright elimination of such weapons was unattainable, but

that mutual security was greatly enhanced by mutual acceptance of limits on the parties' missiles forces. Treaties of a similar nature might be envisaged by other States or regions or even at the global level. In the specialized literature such proposals, however, have been formulated largely with a focus on nuclear weapons rather than on the missiles intended to deliver them.

Limits on deployment; regional limits and bans

42. Some of the most successful regional arms control agreements focus only on limiting the number of weapons of a particular type that can be deployed. This principle has been applied to missiles bilaterally under the 1972 Interim Agreement (Salt I) and regionally to conventional weapons under the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Neither treaty prohibits modernization; they only limit the numbers of controlled systems that can be deployed. With specific reference to missiles, proposals have been made for regional limitation regimes involving ceilings on number and/or ranges of deployed missiles in a given area, in some cases with the further objective of outright missile disarmament.

43. Proposals for a Zone Free from Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East include consideration of the need for regional commitments not to possess or deploy missiles with ranges above an agreed threshold. Discussions usually emphasize ballistic missiles, although cruise missiles are also mentioned. The literature on this subject acknowledges that the non-possession of such missiles would require specific provisions, given that missiles, unlike chemical or biological weapons, are not subject to any universal ban.

44. Proposals for addressing issues related to missiles and missile-defence systems in North-east Asia include an incremental negotiated process with the aim of gradually advancing towards a regional ban on surface-to-surface missiles of any kind.

Limits on testing

45. Complete bans on the flight testing of larger missiles are readily verified through a variety of techniques, as are bans on the static testing of larger missile motors. The dual-use nature of ballistic missiles (which are largely interchangeable with space launch vehicles) and cruise missiles (which share key characteristics with remote piloted vehicles) creates special challenges for verification and confidence-building, but these challenges are neither unprecedented nor exceptional, and have been overcome in other fields of international disarmament. Despite this apparent potential, this option remains relatively underdeveloped both in practice and in the existing specialized literature.

Export controls

46. Export controls, as applied to missiles and missile-related technology, are primarily the responsibility of States and are coordinated, in some instances, through voluntary multilateral arrangements such as the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Missile Technology Control Regime, whose participating States accept limits on their freedom to share missile technologies. As is argued in much of the specialized literature, the effectiveness of such arrangements would be enhanced if the participation of all missile-significant States could be secured. The broadening of these export control arrangements, however, is of high political sensitivity.

B. The Global Control System proposal

47. In addition to proposals by non-governmental experts during the last few years, the Russian Federation has since June 1998 proposed a Global Control System for Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technologies. The main international mechanisms and measures of the Global Control System would include transparency and a monitoring system for missile launches; consideration of security guarantees and incentives for States forgoing or relinquishing weapons of mass destruction-capable missiles; international consultations on missile-related issues; regional confidence-building measures; and international cooperation for the launching of civilian space objects.

C. Longer-term proposals and interim measures

48. The above survey of existing proposals on missile-related issues clearly indicates that the majority of such proposals are focused on ballistic missiles, especially those capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The Global Control System constitutes the most fully developed set of options for building on existing achievements by the Hague Code of Conduct on a multilateral basis, and under the auspices of the United Nations. Conventionally armed missiles and cruise missiles have not received similar attention, with the recent exception of man-portable air defence systems.

49. In addition, the above proposals are broadly acknowledged, including by their authors, to be mid- to long-term prospects at best. While prospects for implementation in the foreseeable future should not be overestimated, even in the current international environment, such proposals deserve serious consideration.

50. Scheffran thus notes that "Strengthening ballistic missile controls will be a long-term process necessarily involving the adoption and evolution of a wide range of measures from the comparatively modest — i.e. a Code of Conduct, bolstered export controls, and missile monitoring and launch-notification agreements — to far-reaching disarmament treaties establishing global missile bans. ... Even though the prospects for such a comprehensive disarmament regime based on multilateral agreements currently seem remote ... this should not exclude conceptual thinking and diplomatic initiatives that broaden political support for such a regime."[1]

51. Likewise, Kurosaki states that, given "the present political environment in the region", his proposal for a North-east Asia missile control and disarmament regime "is intended only to become a starting point for a future policy discussion on cooperative missile control and disarmament in North-east Asia. The feasibility of a proposed regional missile limitation regime is uncertain. However, at least, it seems unquestionable that an initiative to start such a discussion is very much needed today."[2]

52. In the interim, other measures short of actual arms reductions or disarmament also need to be explored. While more modest than the proposals summarized above,

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[1] Jürgen Scheffran, "Moving Beyond Missile Defence: The Search for Alternatives to the Missile Race", *INESAP Information Bulletin*, No. 18, September 2001, p. 10.

[2] Akira Kurosaki, "Proposal for a Regional Missile Limitation Regime: An Alternative to Missile Defence in Northeast Asia", *Journal on Science and World Affairs*, vol. 1, No. 1, p. 13.

such confidence-building measures may contribute to alleviating some of the more salient missile-related international security concerns.

IV. Towards targeted consensus

53. Despite the persistence of sensitive and contentious issues related to missiles in recent years, as noted in paragraph 10 above, which help to explain the difficulties encountered, several areas of existing convergence can be identified, which suggest that further consensus can in fact be developed.

A. Where consensus exists

54. The first area of consensus is that the current situation on missiles (in terms of development, possession and deployment) is unsatisfactory. All States would concur that missiles produce significant and, in certain cases, deleterious effects upon the international security environment. Most States would also acknowledge (albeit for different reasons) that the situation as it stands, in terms of possession and/or proliferation, and in terms of the international efforts to control missiles, is unsatisfactory.

55. Second, and following on from this general acknowledgement that missiles exert effects on international security, it is universally argued that these effects are only negative in the case of another State's missiles. No State regards its own missiles as unduly threatening, and all look upon their missiles as both necessary and legitimate. No State regards its own missiles as part of the problem: on the contrary, missiles are often claimed to be a response to the problem, rather than a part of it.

56. A third area of consensus is that optimum solutions are out of reach, principally because a shared view on what those solutions might be is lacking. Certainly, far-reaching solutions such as bans on missiles (ballistic and/or cruise), regional missile-free zones and other disarmament-oriented options (see paras. 36-46 above) are not going to receive universal, or even majority, support for the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, it appears that most or all States would still concur that if current trends continue, then an already unsatisfactory situation is likely to continue or deteriorate further, rather than improve.

B. Where consensus does not exist

57. Attempts to reach consensus on the issue of missiles in all its aspects are hampered by the emergence of sharp disputes over individual issues. The impact of missile defence, for example, continues to cause controversy and it is highly unlikely that any consensus can be reached in the near future.

58. A discrepancy in international normative practice also appears to be emerging over missile use. On the one hand, a norm of no-first-use appears to be gradually emerging for ballistic missiles, perhaps as a consequence of their lack of accuracy and their widespread status as deterrent weapons. On the other, cruise missiles seem exempt from any such norm and, in fact, have been heavily used in conflict. Reconciling these two norms is not impossible, but attempting to do so in a report

on the issue of missiles in all its aspects presents serious difficulties. As with missile-based anti-missile defences, it appears unlikely that a consensus can be reached in the near future.

59. These examples of absence of consensus militate in favour of a more selective approach in assessing where consensus might lie in the deliberations of a third Panel of Governmental Experts.

C. Where consensus can be developed

60. Amid the controversy, some encouraging developments suggest that pools of consensus are emerging. States that would normally be at loggerheads on a global common position are in fact moving in similar directions, often independently of each other. Consider the following examples.

61. The subscribing States to the Hague Code of Control are committed to transparency measures, hitherto present only in bilateral agreements rather than multilateral ones, thereby developing a norm without precedent in the missile area.

62. India and Pakistan have established a rigorous pre-launch notification regime which covers surface-to-surface ballistic missile tests, and commits the parties to at least 72 hours' notice of launch, with further commitments not to test along their borders or near the Line of Control in Kashmir. They have, in short, moved towards a norm of transparency and pre-launch notification at the bilateral level. Reciprocally, the Hague Code of Conduct explicitly provides that "[s]ubscribing States could, as appropriate and on a voluntary basis, develop bilateral or regional transparency measures".

63. In 1999, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea announced a test moratorium on long-range missiles. The moratorium remained in place until July 2006.

64. The United States and the Russian Federation established a comprehensive pre-launch notification system over a number of years, culminating in the 1988 Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement which covers all strategic ballistic missile launches. The Agreement is of unlimited duration, and was meant to be institutionalized under the Joint Data Exchange Centre.

65. It therefore appears that while all cannot agree on how dangerous missiles are, there may be consensus that certain forms of behaviour are dangerous, especially in a strategic relationship where war is a possibility. Therefore, there may already exist an informal consensus that test-launching a missile without informing anyone is an act that is open to misinterpretation, and that misinterpretation is undesirable even if the missile is not.

66. There is no existing or likely consensus that all missiles are inherently dangerous or illegitimate. States are unlikely to agree that they are all contributing to an international security problem, and even less likely to agree that their own missiles are part of a problem. Nonetheless, a consensus appears to be emerging that certain types of behaviour may produce effects that are dangerous.

67. Therefore, the efforts of the international community could be aimed at building a consensus to make missiles less threatening not necessarily by trying to

get rid of them, but by encouraging behaviour that generates confidence about intentions.

V. Building areas of consensus

68. The absence of any mention of weapons of mass destruction and missiles of any kind in the 2005 World Summit Outcome (General Assembly resolution 60/1) further demonstrates that there is presently no prospect for agreement on far-reaching measures such as significant missile reductions, let alone missile disarmament. The only measures that stand some chance of attracting a consensus are less ambitious, but nonetheless significant measures that can contribute to alleviating some of the more salient missile-related security concerns. These are important issues to which a third Panel of Governmental Experts could turn its attention.

A. Towards missile-specific confidence-building measures

69. Confidence-building measures are a tried and tested device in many areas of international security and might offer some prospects for addressing the issue of missiles. Confidence-building measures tailored to numerous kinds of weapons systems, whether conventional or non-conventional, and strategic settings have been evolved, discussed, negotiated and implemented. In comparison, confidence-building measures specifically adapted to the security concerns created or worsened by missiles of various types remain a significantly underdeveloped field.

70. In principle, however, the options are numerous, and will need to be explored to a much greater extent than has hitherto been done if and when international and particular regional strategic conditions become more auspicious for active consideration of new confidence-building measures. This will involve adapting such measures both to the main stages in the life cycles of missile systems and to patterns of missile-related conduct.

B. Elements for adapting confidence-building measures to the life cycle of missile systems

71. The main stages in the life cycle of missile systems include research and development; flight testing; procurement and production; stockpiling/storage; deployment; transfer; use; and retirement and destruction.

Research and development

72. States that choose to acquire missiles embark on a research and development programme either unilaterally, bilaterally or through international cooperation. Research and development may include the creation of research, development, training and testing facilities and the training of technical personnel as well as the actual design and fabrication of missiles and the ground testing of various components.

Flight testing

73. Flight testing refers to the actual testing of a completed missile system in flight and is distinct from ground or static tests. Flight tests are imperative for new and indigenously developed missile systems, while proven missiles acquired externally might not need to be tested. Although flight testing is often non-military in its intent, the timing, location and manner (for instance, without pre-notification) in which it is carried out can be perceived as signalling threats and warnings.

Procurement or production

74. "Procurement" generally refers to the purchase of missiles by a State from external sources while "production" normally refers to the domestic (or joint) manufacture of missiles in militarily significant numbers. Both procurement and production imply a greater commitment on the part of the State to possess missiles, in terms of capital outlay and the development of manufacturing capabilities, than earlier stages in the life cycle.

Stockpiling/storage

75. Despite possessing missiles (whether procured externally or produced internally), States might choose not to induct them in military formations or deploy them in the field. Instead, they might simply want to store or stockpile missiles in their arsenals for deployment or use at a later stage. Although such storage and stockpiling signals a greater commitment on the part of States to possess, and optionally to use missiles, it is still less threatening than the actual deployment of missiles.

Deployment

76. "Deployment" refers to the actual operationalization and employment of the missiles, generally by relevant military units in the field and, depending on the doctrine of use, implies a greater propensity towards actual use in combat. Some doctrines call for pre-emptive or early use of missiles while others call for a retaliatory or late use of missiles.

Retirement and destruction

77. States possessing missiles may opt unilaterally or upon agreement to refrain from the production or acquisition of certain types of missiles or to reduce, retire or eliminate their holdings of such missiles. Such retirement and destruction might be undertaken unilaterally, bilaterally, multilaterally and with or without verification and inspection.

C. Elements for adapting confidence-building measures to patterns of missile-related conduct

Acquisition

78. Missiles of one type or another are present in the military equipment of virtually all States around the world. The motivations for States to acquire, possess and use missiles of different types vary. Some States are motivated to acquire missiles on account of their politico-strategic environment as well as the particular

characteristics and capabilities of particular missile systems. The main such characteristics of missiles are discussed in the report of the first Panel of Governmental Experts (A/57/229, sect. II.C). The modernization of military doctrines and equipment, whether carried out by States individually or in the context of alliances, can also lead to the acquisition and transfer of missile systems. Another major determinant of States' acquisition of missiles can be the possession, threat of use, and most especially, the actual use of missiles against them. The impetus to acquire missiles in order to defend against and deter the use of similar missiles by an adversary is all the more potent if the policies also involve the possession, use or threat of use of non-conventional weapons, if military means are unavailable or unaffordable as an alternative to missiles, and if outside security assurances and/or assistance are not available.

Transfer

79. Missiles of many types are commonly transferred among States. Transfers of missiles, missile defence systems and technologies are usually carried out for a combination of commercial and politico-strategic motivations, which can involve alliance commitments. Non-State entities, including commercial corporations, also have a prominent role in such transfers across State borders. Transfers can involve complete missile systems or components. In cases of international cooperation in research and development, transfers can also include production equipment and relevant technological information. Such transfers are generally subject to the exporting State's own export control regulations and procedures, where they exist. In some cases, these also reflect the standards of multilateral export control arrangements to which that State subscribes, as well as those that address the exporting State's assessment concerning the implication of such transfers for international and regional security. Concerns have arisen, however, that some missile and missile-related transfers are not carried out with due State authorization and may have an adverse impact on security.

Forgoing/relinquishing

80. Although almost every State possesses some types of missiles, some States also decide to forgo, relinquish or abolish the possession of certain categories of missiles as a matter of policy and as a result of their own assessment of their national security situation and requirements. The absence, unlikelihood or geographical remoteness of an actual or potential threat from missiles or an improvement in the security environment can play a role in such assessments, as can alliance commitments, peace initiatives and other security assurances. Abstaining from seeking or possessing missiles can be a result of the incapacity of a State to acquire them domestically or through import because of economic, technological or industrial constraints. Some States that do possess the economic, technological and industrial ability to develop, produce or import missiles nevertheless choose to abstain from doing so. However, for most States missiles are such a central part of operational and strategic doctrines that controls across the board simply cannot be envisaged.

Restraint

81. States possessing missiles can opt for postures such as de-alerting (separation of warhead from the missile) or de-targeting (setting non-strategic coordinates on

the missiles), which can restrain missile use, or establish "functionally related observable differences" to distinguish between conventional and nuclear missiles, which can reduce misperceptions. Such patterns of missile-related conduct are primarily related to evolving perceptions of the overall security environment and of national security requirements. Restraint can also characterize State practice in missile and missile-related transfers, in view of national or international export control standards and policies. As with the voluntary forgoing and relinquishing of missiles, missile restraint is related to States' own assessment of their security environment.

Use

82. The use of missiles of numerous kinds has become a central feature of contemporary military equipment, strategy, doctrine, operations and tactics. Missiles equipped with nuclear warheads, in particular, still play an important role in the strategies of some States. Nuclear strategies confer a special role on the threat of use of missiles, usually ballistic missiles, as a means of delivering nuclear weapons for purposes including deterrence, compellence or retaliation. There has been no instance of actual use of nuclear-armed missiles. In addition to their nuclear role, cruise missiles may be intended for use as delivery vehicles for biological and chemical weapons, although they have not been used in such configurations. Conventionally armed missiles of all types, including cruise and ballistic missiles, have been used extensively, whether for offensive or defensive purposes, as well as in self-defence. Some types of conventionally armed missiles can be used as weapons of terror, including against populated urban areas. Conventionally armed cruise missiles have been increasingly used in recent years. Other conventionally armed missiles designed for specialized roles, including anti-ship, anti-armour or anti-aircraft missiles, are commonly and extensively used in combat operations worldwide.

D. Missile-relevant confidence-building measures: principles, guidelines and menu of options

83. Confidence-building measures are significant steps voluntarily adopted by States to alleviate or dispel mistrust and tensions inherent to threat perceptions or armed conflict. They can be divided into three categories — information and communication measures; observation and inspection measures; and military constraints — and vary in range from the least intrusive to the most intrusive. Such measures can be unilateral, bilateral, multilateral, regional or global. States decide freely and in the exercise of their sovereignty whether a confidence-building process is to be initiated and, if so, which measures are to be taken and how the process is to be pursued. Confidence-building measures may be elaborated in international agreements or other instruments to which States agree voluntarily to adhere.

Global perspectives

84. Observance of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations contributes to reducing the causes of mistrust regarding military activities, including activities related to missiles.

85. Full implementation of obligations in the field of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation and cooperation in the elaboration and implementation of adequate measures to ensure the verification of such compliance have a considerable confidence-building effect of their own. In this context, greater diligence towards the missile section in the Register of Conventional Arms might be encouraged.

86. At the global level States can also agree to remain engaged with the issue of missiles and confidence-building measures through continuing discussions and deliberations in various United Nations and non-United Nations forums.

Regional perspectives

87. Regional confidence-building measures can be tailored to specific situations by the States that choose to adopt and implement them. To be effective, concrete measures must be adjusted to the specific threat perceptions and sensitivities in a given context or a particular region. The existence of an appropriate regional forum or organization can be conducive, but is not imperative, to carrying out effective regional confidence-building processes.

88. Notwithstanding regional specificities, in view of the ranges of some missiles, the mobility of some missile-launch platforms and the practice of missile transfers across regions, regional confidence-building measures and their effectiveness over time cannot necessarily be circumscribed to a specific geographical area. They can have constructive transregional effects but their feasibility and impact can also be hampered by transregional and global factors.

Bilateral perspectives

89. Bilateral confidence-building measures can be tailored to specific situations by a pair of States that choose to adopt and implement them. To be effective, concrete measures must be adjusted to the specific threat perceptions and sensitivities in a given context or a particular region. The existence of an appropriate regional forum or organization can be conducive, but is not imperative, to carrying out effective bilateral confidence-building processes.

90. Notwithstanding bilateral specificities, and for the same technical reasons as outlined in paragraph 88 above, bilateral confidence-building measures can have a broader constructive effect, both regionally and globally. Conversely, the feasibility and impact of bilateral confidence-building measures can be hampered by regional or global factors.

National or unilateral perspectives

91. Individual States might unilaterally and voluntarily adopt a series of measures to promote confidence-building measures related to the possession, deployment and possible use of their missiles. The nature and effectiveness of unilateral confidence-building measures are related to the specific threat perceptions and sensitivities in a given context or a particular region, the relationship of the State with its immediate neighbours and region and the adoption of similar reciprocal unilateral measures by a neighbouring State or States.

E. Options for missile-specific confidence-building measures

92. While confidence-building measures of a general or non-military nature can have a favourable impact on missile-related concerns, confidence-building measures can also be tailored specifically to the security concerns raised by missiles. Options for such missile-specific voluntary confidence-building measures could be explored according to their relevance to the main stages in the above-mentioned life cycle of missile systems. Voluntary confidence-building measures, whether unilateral, bilateral, multilateral, subregional, regional or global, could be considered by States freely and in the exercise of their sovereignty for their appropriateness to such stages and to specific situations, on the understanding that any given measure could have a different effect depending on prevailing security conditions. Such voluntary confidence-building measures can be grouped into two categories: information and communication measures; and military constraints.

93. Information and communication measures could include:

- Meetings/workshops under appropriate auspices for discussion of missile-related concerns and measures
- Exchange of information on missile programmes
- Regular reporting to the Register of Conventional Arms
- Reporting of flight tests
- Pre-notification of flight tests
- Full implementation of the Hague Code of Conduct's confidence-building measures, with a view to universal participation, and fully transparent access to subscribing States' confidence-building measure submissions
- Visits (to any sites deemed relevant and appropriate, such as research and development or production facilities, flight-testing sites, decommissioning sites, etc.).

94. Military constraints could include:

- Limits on ranges or other characteristics of missiles tested
- Moratoriums on flight tests
- Ban on flight tests
- Non-deployment of missiles
- De-targeting of missiles
- De-alerting of missiles
- No first-use undertakings covering missiles
- Restraint in missile technology transfer and development of indigenous capabilities
- Moratoria/ban on missile-related transfers.

95. In the sphere of missile-related confidence-building measures, the role of the United Nations could include:

- Encouraging States to report missile transfers systematically to the Register of Conventional Arms
- Encouraging the definition and/or implementation of bilateral, regional and other missile-relevant or missile-specific confidence-building measures, notably in situations in which an appropriate regional or other forum for addressing such matters does not exist
- Continuing to provide a venue within the United Nations for in-depth, inclusive discussion of missile issues, while permitting such discussions to focus on existing and emerging areas of consensus.

VI. Conclusions and recommendations

96. The present report concludes that States acknowledge that reaching consensus on the multifaceted issue of missiles cannot take place in one single step. It also concludes that there are essentially two areas where consensus can be reached.

97. The first area of possible consensus proceeds from two complementary findings:

(a) That all or most States would agree that the existing situation with regard to missiles is unsatisfactory; and

(b) That all or most States would agree that ambitious arms control and disarmament measures on missiles are out of reach at present, and are unlikely to be agreed in the foreseeable future.

98. In this context, the present report recommends:

(a) That work be carried out in the framework of the United Nations, including in the context of the forthcoming Panel of Governmental Experts called for by the General Assembly in resolution 59/67, to address the substantive content and appropriateness of missile-specific confidence-building measures, whether at regional or global levels;

(b) These confidence-building measures could be investigated further with respect to ballistic missiles, for which there already exist some transparency-related confidence-building measures at the bilateral and multilateral (though not universal) levels;

(c) Such measures could also be explored with regard to other categories of missiles, including cruise missiles and missile defence systems, on which no multilateral agreement or confidence-building measures currently exist.

99. A second area is one where actual consensus does exist, albeit on one very particular category of missile systems, man-portable air defence systems. The consensus specific to man-portable air defence systems and to the measures for enhancing their control could be explored further.

100. With regard to man-portable air defence systems, the present report recommends that converging efforts under the aegis of the United Nations be undertaken and sustained to:

(a) Deepen with substantive measures the control and assistance elements identified in General Assembly resolution 60/77; and

(b) Broaden adherence as far as possible to the controls stipulated by existing multilateral agreements and initiatives dealing with man-portable air defence systems.

United Nations

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General and complete disarmament

Disarmament and non-proliferation education

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 59/93, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report reviewing the results of the implementation of the recommendations of the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education and possible new promotional opportunities. It contains information from Member States, from international disarmament-related forums, from the United Nations and other international organizations, from the independent Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission and from non-governmental organizations and academic institutions. It relates that information to the 34 recommendations made in the United Nations study.

* A/61/150.

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I. Introduction

1. By its resolution 59/93, entitled "United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education" (A/57/124), the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report reviewing the results of the implementation of the recommendations and possible new opportunities for promoting disarmament and non-proliferation education, and to submit it to the General Assembly at its sixty-first session. Recommendation 32 of the United Nations study encouraged the Secretary-General to prepare a biennial report along the same lines.

2. Recommendation 31 of the study, inter alia, encouraged Member States to inform the Department for Disarmament Affairs on steps taken to implement the recommendations contained in the report.

3. The present report contains information compiled by the Secretary-General on the implementation of the recommendations of the study by Member States, the United Nations and other international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). It should be read in conjunction with the 34 recommendations of the United Nations study.

II. Implementation of the recommendations by Member States

A. Replies received from Member States

Bangladesh

[Original: English]
[22 June 2006]

Recommendations 1, 13 and 28

1. The stand of the Government of Bangladesh is positive to the resolution. We recommend that enhanced diplomatic efforts be made to encourage all nations to support the resolution in order to turn the world into a safer place.

2. Bangladesh conducts various study period/project studies on subjects related to disarmament and non-proliferation. As a part of institutional education, some related topics are also discussed and lectures are delivered at higher military training institutions such as the National Defence College or the Defence Services Command and Staff College. Such study courses relate to a conceptual understanding of disarmament and non-proliferation at the higher level among commanders and senior officers, raising awareness at that level. However, a wide institutional education is not yet imparted on a regular basis on the subjects at lower levels.

3. Bangladesh believes that awareness and education on disarmament and non-proliferation can be increased through arranging seminars, workshops and training programmes in governmental and non-governmental organizations.

Bolivia

[Original: Spanish]
[13 June 2006]

Recommendations 1, 21 and 31

1. General Assembly resolution 59/93, adopted on 16 December 2004, reaffirms the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education, especially on the subject of weapons of mass destruction, but also in the field of small arms and light weapons, terrorism and other challenges to international security and the process of disarmament, including effective verification measures in non-proliferation and arms limitation agreements and other similar obligations.

2. Bolivia has always demonstrated to the international community its profound commitment to peace, rooted in the conviction that all problems between States should be resolved through dialogue and mutual understanding. At the same time, it has demonstrated that it promotes the disarmament and non-proliferation processes. Actions to promote a culture of disarmament must therefore be encouraged so that the international community can make greater efforts to save present and future generations from the scourge of war.

3. In the face of the current challenges to the international system and the threat constituted by illicit trafficking in certain arms, Bolivia believes that a disarmament and non-proliferation education is of primary importance, particularly in all aspects relating to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as firearms, including small arms and light weapons, such as those referred to in the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education.

4. As a sponsor of resolution 59/93, Bolivia is of the view that the genuine promotion of mutual trust requires not only education but also effective action to destroy surplus weapons in each State.

5. All sectors of society, as well as government and non-governmental organizations, must participate to this end.

6. The collective awareness of civil society must be strengthened through educational programmes at various levels, in line with similar activities carried out by other Member States, particularly those in the region.

7. Bolivia has benefited from the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme, which has trained a number of diplomats who now participate in the monitoring and implementation of its national disarmament and non-proliferation policy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship of Bolivia.

Recommendations 13 and 28

8. Bolivia believes that the following measures are vital to the promotion of disarmament and non-proliferation education:

(a) Organizing courses, workshops and seminars in order to disseminate information on disarmament processes and Bolivia's role in their implementation for various sectors of civil society, including the academic community, educational institutions, researchers and experts, parliamentarians, entrepreneurs, government institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the media and others;

(b) Offering courses on disarmament and international security in educational institutions, such as the Bolivian Diplomatic Academy, and in other institutions such as the Bolivian National Police Force and/or the Armed Forces;

(c) Within the framework of the Bolivian National Authority for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, organizing workshops for academicians, government officials, educators, entrepreneurs and other members of civil society to disseminate information on initiatives in this area; and

(d) Heavily promoting this objective through the electronic media.

Canada

[Original: English]
[19 June 2006]

Recommendations 1 and 8

1. Canada has long supported the contribution of civil society, academics and non-governmental organizations to broadening our understanding of disarmament and non-proliferation challenges and to the promotion of our objectives in the non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament field. Disarmament education is thus a key dimension of our broader efforts in this area. In recognition of the depth of knowledge and expertise in the Canadian academic and non-governmental organization community, Foreign Affairs Canada hosts annual consultations with civil society covering a range of topics, such as nuclear challenges and new non-proliferation mechanisms, missile proliferation, controls and defences, chemical and biological weapons, verification and compliance issues, the global partnership programme and space security. Our delegations to the recent Preparatory Committees and Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty have all included civil society representatives. Canada provides funding to non-governmental organizations to convene expert-level consultations, and supports efforts of [the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom] Reaching Critical Will project to ensure wide public access to national statements and other documents emanating from meetings of United Nations disarmament bodies.

Recommendations 13 and 20

2. The International Security Research and Outreach Programme (ISROP) of Foreign Affairs Canada serves as a focal point in Canada for original research and assessment relevant to international security issues, including non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, verification and confidence-building measures. The Programme draws together in-house capability, resources from other Government departments and a network of expertise from the academic community and other knowledgeable individuals in Canada and abroad. As part of its outreach activities, in March 2005, ISROP supports the Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance at Carleton University in Ottawa. The Centre's current focus will be on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties concerned with weapons of mass destruction. In addition to courses, researchers at the Centre examine how treaty compliance is monitored and verified and the methods for encouraging, facilitating and enforcing compliance. The Centre provides academic support for one of Canada's stated foreign policy objectives — verified compliance with legal regimes designed to reduce the threats associated with weapons of mass destruction. ISROP

also supports international security internships aimed at providing graduate-level students in international affairs with the opportunity to conduct substantive work on particular ISROP research priorities.

3. Canada supports independent graduate-level research through several Doctoral and Masters-level research awards, offered in collaboration with the Simons Centre for Peace and Disarmament Studies at the University of British Columbia. The primary objective of these awards is to enhance Canadian graduate-level scholarship on disarmament and non-proliferation issues, and promote the development of centres of excellence in this area.

4. In partnership with the United Nations Association in Canada, the Government has sponsored the production of a disarmament education module intended for students and teachers at the secondary school level. Teaching materials can be viewed at http://www.unac.org/learn. The module has been well received both by students and by educators and has been well integrated into the broader provincial and territorial curricula.

Japan

[Original: English]
[6 June 2006]

Recommendations 1 and 31

1. Japan has chosen to establish its position in the international community as a nation dedicated to peace, aiming towards a safe world free of nuclear weapons. As the only country to have experienced devastation from nuclear bombings, Japan is committed to ensuring that the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki will never be forgotten. With this aim, Japan places utmost importance on disarmament and non-proliferation education, especially for the younger generation. The following illustrates Japan's efforts in this field.

Recommendation 13

United Nations disarmament fellowship programme

2. Japan has been inviting around 25 participants to Japan each year since 1983, amounting to a total of more than 590 participants to the present. Participants receive briefings on the disarmament and non-proliferation policies of Japan. The programme includes a visit to Hiroshima and Nagasaki to learn about Japan as the only country which has suffered from the devastation of atomic bombs, and to gain an insight into the reality of atomic bombings. A large number of diplomats who have participated in the fellowship programme are now actively working in the front lines of global disarmament diplomacy. Japan will continue to actively contribute to this programme.

Recommendations 1 and 31

United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues

3. Japan has sponsored a United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues in a different local city each year since 1989, providing a valuable opportunity for

distinguished disarmament experts from around the world to engage in useful discussions. Last year's United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues was held in Kyoto in August under the theme "The United Nations after six decades and renewed efforts for the promotion of disarmament" and gave rise to a very meaningful exchange of views. The 2006 Conference is to be held from 21 to 23 August in Yokohama.

Recommendation 14

Citizen's forum on disarmament and non-proliferation education

4. In August 2003, during the United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues held in Osaka, a citizen's forum on disarmament and non-proliferation education was held with the participation of 50 teachers from primary, junior-high and high schools in Osaka, officials of international organizations and various experts on disarmament and non-proliferation. A citizen's forum on disarmament and non-proliferation education was also held in July 2004 during the United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues in Sapporo, and there was active discussion between teachers and experts.

Recommendations 1 and 31

Ministry of Foreign Affairs materials

5. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan has been taking concrete steps to disseminate information on various efforts it has been making in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation. "Japan's Disarmament Policy" was published in 2002 in Japanese, followed by an English version in 2003. In 2004, an updated edition, "Japan's Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy", was published in both Japanese and English. In March 2006, the third edition was published in Japanese. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also established, and regularly updates, a comprehensive web page with readily available information on Japan's activities in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation.

Submission of a working paper on disarmament and non-proliferation education to the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

6. Japan jointly submitted working papers on disarmament and non-proliferation education to the 2005 Review Conference, underlining the importance of education as a tool for strengthening disarmament and non-proliferation for future generations.

Participation in the United Nations Governmental Experts Group on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education

7. Japan participated in the Group of Governmental Experts on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education, established following the General Assembly resolution adopted in November 2000, requesting the Secretary-General to prepare a study on disarmament and non-proliferation. The Group submitted a report to the Secretary-General two years later, containing a series of recommendations for immediate and long-term implementation, which formed the basis for the draft resolutions adopted by the General Assembly in 2002 and 2004.

Inviting disarmament experts

8. Based on the recommendations of the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, Japan has invited prominent educators on disarmament and non-proliferation since 2002. In November 2002, Kathleen Sullivan, a representative of Educators for Social Responsibility, was invited to conduct a nuclear disarmament education tour in Japan, working with high school students, civic leaders and *hibakusha* in Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Tokyo. Furthermore, in January 2004, Natalie Goldring, from the Programme on Global Security and Disarmament at the University of Maryland, and in February 2005, William Potter, from the Monterey Institute of International Studies, were also invited to Japan to give lectures on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In February 2006, Japan invited Jean Pascal Zanders, director of the BioWeapons Prevention Project, who gave a lecture on the importance of the disarmament of biochemical weapons.

Recommendation 13

Disarmament and non-proliferation seminar

9. The Centre for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation in Japan held a disarmament and non-proliferation seminar in September 2005, for two days, with the aim of deepening understanding on recent disarmament and non-proliferation trends, mainly for those considering taking active roles in this field in the future. A seminar was also held over three days in March 2006 with a series of presentations covering a variety of related issues, resulting in a lively exchange between participants. Lecturers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also attended the seminar.

Recommendations 1 and 31

Peace efforts/peace education

10. Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the only cities to have suffered from the devastation of atomic bombs, hold a yearly Peace Ceremony to prevent the recurrence of such a tragedy. In 2005, marking the sixtieth anniversary, it gathered numerous people from Japan and all over the world.

11. The World Conference of Mayors for Peace, which the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki launched in 1982 and which is held every four years to encourage cities to work together towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, convened in Hiroshima in 2005.

12. The cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, along with the International Peace Research Association, have established Hiroshima-Nagasaki Peace Study Courses in universities around the world by sending peace education materials and lecturers, establishing university-level peace education models and exchanging opinions and methodology.

13. The Government of Japan has supported a number of efforts by local governments, universities, NGOs and various organizations to organize exhibitions relating to atomic bombs in foreign countries, including the Hiroshima-Nagasaki A-bomb exhibitions in Paris in September 2005.

Mauritius

[Original: English]
[20 June 2006]

Recommendation 14

A "train the trainers" programme in this field is desired.

New Zealand

[Original: English]
[24 June 2006]

Recommendations 1 and 31

In response to recommendation 31 of the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, encouraging Member States to designate a focal point for disarmament and non-proliferation education and training, the Disarmament Division of the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has been so designated. This designation is not meant to imply that the Ministry is in a position to take responsibility for implementation of the report. That responsibility is spread over a number of New Zealand Government and non-government agencies. However the Ministry will continue to be responsible for reporting as required on implementation of the report.

Suriname

[Original: English]
[5 July 2006]

Recommendations 1 and 31

1. The Government of Suriname continues to support the principles and objectives of disarmament and non-proliferation education. Such education will benefit the process of disarmament and non-proliferation. We support therefore the 34 recommendations of the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education.

Recommendations 14 and 28

2. In accordance herewith training programmes are being conducted in order to increase awareness and promote a culture that would enhance disarmament and non-proliferation.

3. The Government is guided by the recommendations of the group of experts, the Government departments with portfolios of relevance to this matter, together with civil society organizations, will jointly examine the situation in order to advise on the way forward.

4. Currently, however, issues pertaining to disarmament, non-proliferation and security in general are part of the curriculum of such courses as the (advanced) Military Training Programme.

5. Although the lack of sufficient capacity at the national level constitutes a major challenge we will continue our efforts to increase disarmament and non-proliferation training and education.

B. First Committee

Recommendations 1 and 33

4. At the initiative of the Chairman of the First Committee, during the interactive debate on disarmament and non-proliferation (DNP) education on 21 October 2005, two prominent educators were invited for the first time to make presentations on nuclear and small arms education. Kathleen Sullivan, Coordinator of the Nuclear Weapons Education and Action Project of Educators for Social Responsibility, Metropolitan Area, in New York, shared her views on the guiding principles of DNP education in the United Nations study on the subject, and conducted a classroom demonstration of the firepower of the current nuclear arsenals.[1] Peter Lucas, of the John W. Draper Master's Programme in Humanities and Social Thought at New York University, introduced a detailed curriculum on small arms and human rights created by teachers in training, aimed at high school and early university students.

C. 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York

Recommendations 1, 13 and 31

5. The issue of DNP education was considered by Main Committee I. Egypt, Hungary, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Poland and Sweden submitted a working paper on the issue (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.30), which encouraged States parties to support and develop DNP activities, to cooperate with academic institutions to develop model curricula on the consequences of proliferation and the importance of disarmament, to designate a focal point on DNP education and training and to inform the Department for Disarmament Affairs on steps taken to implement the DNP study. Further, Japan submitted a working paper on its efforts in DNP education (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.31).

D. Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, Mexico City, 26 to 28 April 2005

Recommendations 1 and 13

6. At the above Conference, the participating States parties or signatories to the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba adopted a Declaration of the Conference of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, paragraph 30 of which refers to DNP education and reads as follows: "We express our conviction that disarmament and non-proliferation education constitutes an important measure that can contribute to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons threats. We therefore encourage all States to promote programmes instilling the values of peace, disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation in their respective educational and academic spheres and

[1] For the full speech, see http://disarmament.un.org/education.

call upon IAEA and donor countries to help in the promotion and implementation of such programmes" (see A/60/121, annex III).

III. Implementation of the recommendations by the United Nations and other international organizations

A. Department for Disarmament Affairs

Recommendations 5, 13 and 17

7. The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific conducted, in cooperation with the Government of Indonesia, a workshop on the promotion of the United Nations study, in Bali, on 21 and 22 December 2005. More than 60 participants representing international organizations, Governments, NGOs, the press, academic institutions and elected officials were exposed to a wide range of disarmament and non-proliferation issues. The participants concluded that there was a need to distil the wealth of available information in easy-to-use curriculum materials for wide dissemination, and stressed the need for education of journalists.[2]

Recommendation 7

8. Further to a request made in resolution 479 of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) of 8 November 2005, discussions were initiated in March 2006 between the organization and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UN-LiREC), for the development of peace and DNP education courses. The courses will be organized in cooperation with the University for Peace (UPEACE) and other entities and are aimed at decision makers and young people in the region. Pursuant to a request of the Government of Peru, a first course will be held in 2007 in Lima.

Recommendation 13

9. UN-LiREC has been active in conducting training courses for the law enforcement community, members of parliament and their advisers and representatives of non-governmental organizations.[3]

Recommendation 18

10. The Department for Disarmament Affairs and the Global Teaching and Learning Project (Cyberschoolbus) Unit of the Department of Public Information are currently collaborating on a project to create a disarmament component on the United Nations Cyberschoolbus website, dealing with the entire range of disarmament and non-proliferation issues, but focusing in the first place on nuclear disarmament and the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. The site is being designed with a dual portal: a multimedia curriculum for use by educators with

[2] The presentation made at the workshop by Dr. Kathleen Sullivan describing the United Nations study and its implementation is available at disarmament.un.org/education.

[3] For a full listing of the courses offered from July 2004 to June 2005 and from July 2005 to June 2006, see A/60/132.

suggestions for activities to engage students on the issues from an international perspective and an independent entrance platform for students working on their own.

Recommendation 19

11. The Department for Disarmament Affairs continued to organize the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament, aimed at young diplomats, on which a separate report is being submitted to the General Assembly at its sixty-first session (A/61/130).

Recommendation 24

12. In New York and Geneva, the Department for Disarmament Affairs trained more than 65 graduate and undergraduate students participating in various university-related internship programmes. In selecting interns, the Department endeavoured to achieve gender balance and equitable geographical representation, though difficulties remained in increasing the number of interns from developing countries.

Recommendations 27 and 28

13. The Department for Disarmament Affairs and The Hague Appeal for Peace completed their joint two-year Peace and Disarmament Education Project at the end of January 2005. Its goal was to "disarm the minds" of young people and sustain small arms collection initiatives through peace education in high schools, in four countries on four continents, Albania, Cambodia, the Niger and Peru. The Department for Disarmament Affairs is grateful for the support of the United Nations Foundation with contributions from Andorra, the Czech Republic, Germany and Japan, and the Ford Foundation and the Swedish International Development Agency. To preserve the lessons learned and to offer a guide for the replication of such projects, a joint publication was released, entitled *Peace and Disarmament Education: Changing Mindsets to Reduce Violence and Sustain the Removal of Small Arms*.[4]

Recommendation 29

14. The Department for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) jointly organized a discussion on 12 October 2004, on the sidelines of the First Committee, to draw attention to the first biennial report on the implementation of the study's recommendations. Several delegations, as well as representatives of international organizations and non-governmental organizations, attended. Participants engaged in a discussion on ways and opportunities to promote and stimulate new initiatives, identify gaps, share resources and facilitate information exchange and reporting. UNIDIR proposed assisting States in submitting reports on their activities in implementing the recommendations.

Recommendation 30

15. The Department for Disarmament Affairs and UNIDIR continued to brief the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters on a biennial basis on education and training work.

[4] Available at http://www.haguepeace.org.

B. Department of Public Information

Recommendations 3 and 4

16. With its new emphasis on educational outreach, the *UN Chronicle* (published quarterly in English and French) has featured numerous educational articles on the need for DNP education and combating terrorism. Besides regularly highlighting the evolving trends of disarmament initiatives in the debates of the General Assembly and in particular in the First Committee, the magazine has featured articles on the post-September 11 world, terrorism, child soldiers and the weaponization of society in West Africa.

Recommendation 23

17. The "UN Works" campaign produced two family-oriented educational documentaries for *What's Going On?* related to the issue of disarmament: one on child soldiers hosted by Messenger of Peace Michael Douglas, and another on landmines hosted by Laurence Fishburne. It also created two website features on both issues with links to the Department for Disarmament Affairs site and other partners.

Recommendation 23

18. The United Nations study was covered in radio news programmes as well as radio magazine and feature programmes for regional and worldwide dissemination. Topics ranged from disarmament in crises to mine clearance and small arms and light weapons in Africa.

C. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

Recommendation 1

19. A strong focus of UNIDIR education work over the past two years has been on diversifying its outreach programme both to reach new audiences and better to meet the needs of those already familiar with the Institute. Many UNIDIR education-related activities that were described in the report of the Secretary-General (A/59/178) continue and are not repeated here.

Recommendation 2

20. UNIDIR continued to produce and disseminate disarmament research and materials, especially its journal, *Disarmament Forum*, and a wide range of books and reports. *Disarmament Forum* is now in its seventh year of publishing disarmament, non-proliferation and security analysis.

Recommendation 3

21. UNIDIR published materials in United Nations official languages and in other languages, the latter through assistance from individual Governments. For example, *Coming to Terms with Security: A Lexicon for Arms Control, Disarmament and Confidence-Building* is now available in Arabic, English, French, Hungarian, Korean and Spanish. *Disarmament Forum* is published in its entirety in English and French.

Recommendation 4

22. As part of its outreach strategy, UNIDIR continues to develop new avenues for dissemination. Recent examples include posting on its website audio files of a debate held in Geneva on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of UNIDIR, and distributing a CD-ROM spreadsheet for calculating the costs of small arms and light weapons storage.

Recommendation 12 and 23

23. UNIDIR hosted the Soka Gakkai International (SGI)-USA exhibit "Building a Culture of Peace for the Children of the World" in 2005 at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, which was followed by a public workshop on the same theme with the International Committee of Artists for Peace (ICAP) and SGI at the Montreux Jazz Festival. On the occasion of the Jazz Festival's fortieth anniversary, UNIDIR and ICAP hosted a workshop entitled "Artists as Peacemakers".

Recommendation 17

24. UNIDIR continued to strengthen its outreach activities with the press. Materials produced by UNIDIR are used by journalists around the world as reference and background material and as a source for expert information. UNIDIR, through the Geneva Forum, maintains its *Media Guide to Disarmament and Arms Control*, an electronic publication with a global focus. It contains the names and contact details of over 200 experts in 14 areas of disarmament and six geographical regions, as well as links to further useful information on the web. Many UNIDIR seminars and meetings are open to the press. The Institute also organizes regular press briefings before and after disarmament conferences and often when reports and books are published.

Recommendation 18

25. UNIDIR reaffirms its willingness to cooperate with the Department of Public Information, the Department for Disarmament Affairs, NGOs and others to help adapt materials or to assist in the development of new ones.

Recommendation 27

26. In order to support peacekeeping and peacebuilding, UNIDIR is working on including women in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes through better research, training and education to further the objectives of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000).

D. Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL)

[Original: Spanish]

Recommendation 1

27. The OPANAL Conference and Council have made every effort to ensure that the issue of education for peace, disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation continues to be included in their activities.

Recommendations 13 and 31

28. At the XVIII Regular Session of the General Conference, held in Havana in November 2003, resolution CG445 entitled "Education for peace, disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation" was adopted. The resolution resolves:

> 1. To endorse resolution A/RES/57/60 of November 22, 2002, of the General Assembly of the United Nations;
>
> 2. To encourage the Member States of OPANAL to promote education in the values of peace, disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation in the appropriate educational and academic media;
>
> 3. To urge the Member States of OPANAL to implement the recommendations contained in resolution 57/60, entitled "United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education";
>
> 4. To request the Secretary General to prepare a specific proposal on the application by the Agency of the recommendations included in the United Nations study and aimed at international and regional agencies;
>
> 5. To also request the Secretary General to continue the work of disseminating the Treaty of Tlatelolco in media and academic institutions, promoting educational activities that will contribute to education for peace, disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation among the Member States, and to seek the cooperation of academic institutions in said States, also using, when applicable, the agreements and memoranda of understanding that OPANAL has entered into with other international agencies;
>
> 6. To entrust the Secretary General with informing the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the present resolution, as an expression of the desire of the Member States of the Treaty of Tlatelolco to recognize, affirm and guarantee the right to a culture of peace, disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.

29. At the XIX Regular Session held in Santiago, Chile, in November 2005, resolution CG479 was adopted. The resolution resolved:

> 1. **To exhort** the Member States of OPANAL to implement the recommendations found in UN General Assembly Resolution 59/93 "United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education";
>
> 2. **To recognize also** the importance of civil society, including non-governmental organizations, in disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation education;
>
> 3. **To instruct** the Secretary General to reinitiate contact in order to study the mechanisms for cooperation with the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament, and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UN-LiREC) to conduct joint activities within the objectives defined in the Memorandum of Understanding signed on 29 April 2003;
>
> 4. **To also instruct** the Secretary General to continue efforts to disseminate the Treaty of Tlatelolco in the media and academic institutions, promoting educational activities that will contribute to peace, disarmament, and non-proliferation education among the Member States and to seek the cooperation of academic institutions in said States, as well as NGOs, also using, where

applicable, the agreements and memoranda of understanding that OPANAL has reached with other international agencies;

5. **To request** that the Secretary General prepare a report on the measures adopted, as well as the activities carried out by OPANAL to promote peace, disarmament and non-proliferation education for presentation to the General Assembly during it sixty-first session;

6. **To entrust** the Secretary General with informing the Secretary-General of the United Nations of this resolution, as an expression of the will of the Treaty of Tlatelolco Member States to recognize, affirm and guarantee the right to a culture of peace, disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation."

30. At the conclusion of that Session, the Declaration of Santiago de Chile was adopted. In its paragraph 13, it resolved:

> "To express our conviction that disarmament and non-proliferation education constitutes an important measure that can contribute to achieving a world free of nuclear threats. We therefore encourage all States to promote programs instilling the values of peace, disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation in their respective education and academic spheres".

31. In addition to the cooperation agreements it entered into prior to 2003, such as its 1972 agreement with the International Atomic Energy Organization, OPANAL has signed agreements with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Pacific Islands Forum, the University of Malaga and the Latin American Parliament. These agreements promote, in particular, joint activities that will contribute to education for peace, disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.

32. In February 2004, OPANAL organized and participated in the 38th anniversary of the adoption of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. In that connection, it expresses its gratitude to Ambassador Joao Augusto de Araujo Castro of Brazil, the driving force behind the denuclearization initiative in Latin America; Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles of Mexico, the architect of the Treaty of Tlatelolco; and Ambassador Leopoldo Benites Vinueza of Ecuador, the first Secretary General of OPANAL.

33. OPANAL, together with the Government of the United Mexican States, organized the Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, held in April 2005 in Mexico City. The Declaration adopted by the Conference expressed support for this issue (see para. 6 above).

Activities undertaken by the Secretary General in the field of education for peace, disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation

34. Only those activities falling in the period covered by the present report are listed below. The full report is contained on the website of the Department for Disarmament Affairs.

(a) In July 2004, at the invitation of the Mexican Bar Association, the Secretary General gave a lecture on the Treaty of Tlatelolco in Guadalajara, Mexico;

(b) In September 2004, he was invited by the NGO Soka Gakkai to the commemoration of the declaration by its President, Josei Toda, in Mexico

City. He participated in a seminar on peace and disarmament entitled "The challenge for citizens of the twenty-first century"; the title of his lecture was "Efforts of the international community to prohibit nuclear weapons and impede their proliferation";

(c) In October 2004, he participated in the Fall International Days of the Institute of Higher Learning of Colegio Holandés of Mexico. On that occasion, he delivered a lecture on the topic "International peace and security";

(d) In December 2004, at the invitation of the Government of New Zealand and the Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament for Global Action, he gave a lecture entitled "Nuclear-weapon-free zones and the promotion of nuclear non-proliferation" in Wellington. The lecture was attended by parliamentarians from 29 countries;

Recommendation 4

(e) In July 2005, he appeared on the programme "Entrevista Ventana Semanal" on Channel 22 on Mexican television marking the 60th anniversary of the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. The interview focused on the activities of OPANAL and the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Recommendation 1

(f) In August 2005, at the invitation of the Senate of the United Mexican States, he participated in the Conference entitled "Hiroshima and Nagasaki: 60 years later. Reflections on the nuclear threat in the twenty-first century". He delivered a lecture on the topic "The Treaty of Tlatelolco, Mexican diplomacy, and the promotion of nuclear disarmament";

(g) In February 2006, he gave a lecture on the topic "Human security and armed conflict" at the Seminar on Human Security organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico;

(h) In February 2006, he gave a lecture at the Universidad del Valle in Mexico, Texcoco campus, on "The Treaty of Tlatelolco and nuclear-weapon-free zones";

(i) In April 2006, he was invited to attend the IAEA Regional Seminar on Verifying Compliance with Nuclear Non-proliferation Commitments: Strengthened Safeguards, Small Quantities Protocols and Additional Protocols, held in Quito, Ecuador, where he lectured on the topic "Verification and the strengthening of the regional treaties on nuclear-free-weapon zones: OPANAL perspective";

(j) The Secretary-General has also sent notes to various Mexican universities, offering to participate in seminars or courses to raise awareness of the purposes and objectives of the Treaty of Tlatelolco as well as the need to expand the culture of peace, disarmament and non-proliferation;

(k) The Secretary General of OPANAL maintains an open-door policy towards university students applying for internships or wishing to participate in community service projects and encourages them to study in depth the importance of disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.

Recommendation 5

35. In accordance with the memorandum of understanding concluded between OPANAL and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean and paragraph 3 of resolution CG 479 mentioned above, the Secretary General has reinitiated contact with the Centre with a view to conducting joint activities.

36. The Secretary General, at the invitation of the Director of the Centre, Mr. Péricles Gasparini, travelled to Lima to discuss future cooperation between the two organizations and to establish a basis of critical thought on the topic education for peace, disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, taking into account the particularities of the various target countries and groups. At this meeting, held from 6 to 8 March 2006, a document entitled "Education for peace, disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. Coordination meeting" was drawn up. On 24 March, the Secretary General submitted the document to the OPANAL Council at its 220th session, and the Council decided that the Director and Adviser of the Centre should be present at its next meeting.

Recommendation 13

37. Mr. Péricles Gasparini and Ambassador Hugo Palma, Director and Adviser of the Regional Centre, respectively, visited the OPANAL office on 25 and 26 May and submitted the Centre's working paper to the Council. This document called for the implementation of various activities in the field of information, awareness raising and training with the participation of various social groups, governments, parliaments and international organizations with the ultimate objective of strengthening international peace and security and ensuring strict compliance with international law. Joint activities would include the preparation and development of courses on disarmament and non-proliferation education for various groups and entities, including schools, universities, the media and political leaders.

E. University for Peace[5]

Recommendation 13

38. The University for Peace (UPEACE) has taken a number of steps to implement the relevant recommendations mandated by the United Nations study. It has developed a DNP education course module, which is taught as a credit course for the Master of Arts degree programme on international peace studies. The course covers two major aspects: (a) weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological weapons and nuclear weaponry and (b) small arms and light weapons. The course highlights the dangers to peace inherent in the spread of both weapons of mass destruction as well as small arms and light weapons.[6]

39. The DNP education course module continued to be a regular feature of the UPEACE Master of Arts degree programme and will therefore be offered every year. The University will also be exploring possibilities for developing a full-

[5] The University for Peace is an international treaty organization established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 35/55 of 5 December 1980 to support the central peace and security objectives of the United Nations through a worldwide movement of education for peace.

[6] A copy of the course syllabus is available at disarmament.un.org/education.

fledged postgraduate programme on DNP education, depending on the availability of resources and other factors. Possibilities for offering this programme jointly with other institutions around the world are also being explored.

Recommendations 13, 14, 21 and 23

40. UPEACE has also developed the "Sharing Knowledge for Peace" programme, which provides global access to instructors, students and learners in institutions around the world. A major objective of the programme is to disseminate teaching materials, courses and modules for various programmes to partner institutions around the world, using state-of-the-art technology, for the instruction of peace and conflict studies, making it possible for large numbers of students at their home universities to study specific issues. The disarmament and non-proliferation module would be part of the dissemination programme. The "UPEACE GlobalEd" distance education programme will offer web-based teaching in the major fields, including disarmament.

IV. Implementation of the recommendations by the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission

Recommendations 1 and 24

41. In its report "Weapons of Terror; Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms",[7] the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission states that adequate knowledge and concern "at the popular level" are needed "to exercise effective pressure on governments regarding WMD issues". Several findings of the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education are cited and the Commission noted that, although the study was largely uncontentious, the follow-up to the report was gradual and incomplete. The Commission thus recommended that organizations with security-relevant agendas re-examine the 2002 United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education and consider ways in which they could foster and support such education and an informed public debate. Governments should fund student internships at multilateral institutions working on weapons of mass destruction issues.

V. Implementation of the recommendations by civil society and non-governmental organizations

A. Center for Nonproliferation Studies

42. As part of its mission to combat the spread of WMD by training the next generation of non-proliferation specialists while raising global public awareness on WMD issues, the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) has developed various educational activities, listed below. For a fuller description, see http://disarmament.un.org/education.[8]

[7] Chapter 7, "Export controls, international assistance, and non-governmental actors". Available electronically at http://www.wmdcommission.org.

[8] Also see http://cns.miis.edu/cns/index.htm.

Recommendations 2, 21, 22 and 25

43. CNS has developed a series of tutorials designed to educate and provide useful material about treaties through interactive text and enriched multimedia segments, including timelines, maps and numerous links to relevant resources. The tutorials are periodically updated to reflect changes in the non-proliferation environment and are self-paced for a learning environment accessible to everyone via the web. CNS has developed tutorials on nuclear non-proliferation, chemical weapons, biological weapons, radiological terrorism and nuclear terrorism.

Recommendation 3

44. Various CNS publications are translated into Russian, including online publications that CNS produced for the Nuclear Threat Initiative. In addition to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) tutorial, country profiles are also available in Russian.

Recommendation 4

45. All CNS online publications are accessible through the web. Online publications include the Inventory of International Non-Proliferation Organizations and Regimes, International Export Control Observer. Links to these publications are sent through an e-mail LISTSERVE.

Recommendation 6

46. The core educational programme of CNS is the Certificate in Non-Proliferation Studies, awarded by the Graduate School of International Policy Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Available to Master's degree students and qualified non-degree students, the Certificate programme is designed to prepare students for professional careers in non-proliferation, arms control or disarmament. The Certificate is the only one of its kind in the United States of America. In the past two academic years, 92 students have earned the Certificate.

47. The high school outreach and exchange programme of CNS, the Critical Issues Forum, brings United States high schools together with schools in "closed nuclear cities" of the Russian Federation to study non-proliferation and international security issues. The 2005-2006 programme included a teacher development workshop held in Monterey in November 2005, including curriculum development and education and training for high school teachers. A student-teacher conference was held in April 2006 in which over 60 students, teachers, and parents from 5 high schools in California, 2 high schools in Texas, and 10 schools in Russia's closed nuclear cities (Lesnoy, Novouralsk, Ozersk, Penza, Sarov, Seversk, Snezhinsk, Zarechniy, Zelenogorsk and Zheleznogorsk) participated. The conference was the culmination of a year-long investigation into nuclear weapons and non-proliferation by the high school students. Research activities ranged from scientific and environmental aspects to social and cultural issues associated with nuclear weapons.

Recommendation 7

48. CNS organized a workshop on the 2005 NPT Review Conference in Annecy, France, in March 2005. Entitled "The 2005 Review Conference: finding common

ground", the workshop provided an informal forum for national delegations to discuss the most pressing concerns regarding NPT and the possible options the States parties have in addressing these challenges at the May 2005 Review Conference. The event was attended by 82 participants from 40 different States parties, including the President of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, its three Main Committee Chairpersons and senior representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations and selected non-governmental organizations.

49. The Visiting Fellows Programme provides comprehensive training for policy professionals from Russia and other former Soviet States, China and other countries. Visiting fellows spend three to four months in Monterey taking part in presentations, tutorials and directed research. In 2005-2006, CNS hosted 25 visiting fellows from seven countries.

50. The English Language and Non-Proliferation (ELAN) Programme offers intensive English language instruction as well as an introduction to non-proliferation issues. CNS hosted 21 ELAN fellows in 2005-2006 from four countries.

Recommendation 19 and 24

51. CNS offers part-time graduate research assistantships, enabling students pursuing the Non-Proliferation Certificate to experience a unique combination of formal coursework and on-the-job training through part-time paid research assistantships at CNS. As an assistant, a student contributes to databases, website publications, fact sheets and analytical briefs.

52. The Center offers full or partial tuition scholarships to students working towards a Certificate in Non-Proliferation Studies. Scholarships are awarded on a competitive basis, with both scholarly and professional experience taken into account. Applicants are expected to pursue a career in the field of non-proliferation of WMD.

53. Working towards a Certificate in Non-Proliferation Studies opens possibilities for internships at a number of international organizations, including the United Nations in New York, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, IAEA, the Conference on Disarmament, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, and OPANAL.

54. Since 1997, CNS has offered an on-the-job training summer programme for undergraduate students in non-proliferation studies. These undergraduate students have the rare opportunity to pursue research in a field typically not available to undergraduate students. Participants conduct research on issues related to the spread and control of WMD, including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and on regional security issues involving the former Soviet Union, East Asia, South Asia and the Middle East. In addition to working on ongoing projects at CNS, students develop their own research projects under the guidance of senior CNS faculty. Students are also invited to attend CNS lectures and training seminars throughout the summer.

Recommendation 23

55. As part of the Certificate in Non-Proliferation Studies, students participate in a semester-long simulation of international or bilateral arms control treaty negotiations. In the Arms Control Negotiation Simulation course, one of the core

courses for the Certificate, students adopt the roles of negotiators representing parties to bilateral or multilateral agreements.

B. University of Malaga

Recommendations 1 and 14

56. The University of Malaga has entered into an agreement with OPANAL concerning cooperation on developing programmes of study on disarmament and sharing of information (see also section III.D above).

C. Educators for Social Responsibility, Metropolitan Area

Recommendations 3, 4, 7, 17, 22, 23, 26 and 29

57. Educators for Social Responsibility, Metropolitan Area, has carried out presentations in high schools throughout the New York metropolitan area, as well as in San Diego, United States of America, and Tijuana, Mexico; has conducted disarmament education lecture series at five colleges and universities in the New York metropolitan area, in collaboration with the Global Resource Centre for the Environment Policy Institute; organized four school visits for 12 *hibakusha* visiting New York during the 2005 NPT Review Conference; facilitated disarmament education workshops in Tokyo, Kyoto, Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Yokohama during July and August 2005; supported youth activism on nuclear issues through the Educators for Social Responsibility New York-based youth group Students against Nuclear Insanity for Tomorrow's Youth (SANITY);[9] coordinated two city-wide youth caucuses on nuclear issues, involving over 500 participants, on the sixtieth anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 2005 and on the twentieth anniversary of the Chernobyl accident, screening Maryann De Leo's Academy Award-winning film *Chernobyl Heart*, and viewing works by Magnum photographer Paul Fusco in 2006.

D. Peace Boat

Recommendations 3, 4, 7, 10, 17, 23 and 27

58. Peace Boat is an international non-governmental and non-profit organization based in Japan that works to promote peace, human rights, equal and sustainable development and respect for the environment. It pursues this through the organization of global educational programmes, responsible travel, cooperative projects and advocacy activities, carried out in partnership with other civil society organizations and communities in Japan, north-eastern Asia and around the world.[10] Its main activities are carried out through a chartered passenger ship that travels the world on peace voyages. Each three-month global voyage involves about 900 participants of all ages and visits from 15 to 20 countries.[11]

[9] For views of students about SANITY, see http://disarmament.un.org/education.

[10] The full submission made by the Peace Boat is available at http://disarmament.un.org/education.

[11] For more information about Peace Boat see http://www.peaceboat.org/english.

59. Peace Boat voyages include a general on-board education programme, part of which is devoted to disarmament education units, comprising intensive peace and sustainability studies, and on-land education including landmine abolition and advocacy outreach to primary schools, including fund-raising and cooperative visits to Cambodia. The Youth Ambassadors for Disarmament programme, with nuclear educator Kathleen Sullivan, brought seven youth activists from the nuclear-weapon States, plus India and Pakistan, onto the voyage.[12] The Ambassadors are currently developing a manual on disarmament education and — as part of ongoing follow-up — have made commitments to visit the Ministry of Education in their home countries to lobby for the introduction of disarmament education into the national curriculum.[13]

E. Public Media, Inc./Richter Productions

60. Public Media, Inc., a non-profit organization which supports the work of Richter Productions, an independent film company based in New York City, produced a film called *The Last Atomic Bomb*.[14] The film commemorates the dropping of the bomb on Nagasaki in 1945, profiling the tragic yet inspiring story of Sakue Shimohira who, at the age of 10, was hiding in a shelter near ground zero when the bomb exploded.

F. Atomic Mirror report

61. The Atomic Mirror uses the creative arts (film, music, images, writing, performance and ceremony) to reveal the consequences of the nuclear age and to inspire people to take action for a nuclear-free world.[15] Examples of activities are: hosting young filmmakers Stephen Sotor and Trace Gaynor at the United Nations during the 2005 NPT Review Conference to present their film *Genie in a Bottle*; organizing a symposium at the United Nations with artist Marguerite Kahrl and curator Ombretta Agro to speak about her exhibition *Atomica*, and the works of Ingo Gunther;[16] organizing events on the topic of the twentieth anniversary of the Chernobyl accident; and two discussion sessions with art photographer Yuriy Kosin during his visit to New York in April 2006. A former cybernetic scientist at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, now an artist, Mr. Kosin's work was also on display in the visitors' lobby of the United Nations as part of the official commemoration.

VI. Conclusions

62. **As evident in the submissions above, partnering in this field yields results. In the context of peace education, youth in four countries around the globe have learned about their national legislation and regulations about small arms; decision makers in Latin America and the Caribbean will familiarize**

[12] See http://disarmament.un.org/education.

[13] Statement presented by Youth Ambassadors to Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see http://www.peaceboat.org/english/nwps/sm/arc/050829/index.html.

[14] See http://www.richtervideos.com.

[15] See http://www.atomicmirror.org.

[16] Creator of the globe depicting the International Monitoring System of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO, which is on permanent display in the secretariat in Vienna.

themselves with the concepts and impact of their region's decision to adopt a treaty that declares the region a zone free of nuclear weapons; students of global security at the University of Malaga will be creating a virtual library of information about nuclear issues; and many in-service officials of the Government of Indonesia have become aware of their Government's policies and activities at the multilateral level on a wide range of arms control and disarmament issues.

63. **The reports received, from the Government sector and civil society, and their type, quantity and diversity, indicate that there is a strong interest on the part of Government officials as well as students at all levels of education to learn the details about weapons and their relationship to and impact on politics, economics, social trends and the environment. Despite the challenges that persist in fund-raising for all disarmament efforts and particularly for DNP education, the United Nations study continued to serve as a useful structure for United Nations-related work and as a point of reference in the field. Efforts need to be continued to implement the recommendations of the study and follow the good examples of how they are being implemented to stimulate even further long-term results.**

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Item 54 (b) of the provisional agenda*
Globalization and interdependence: International migration and development

Letter dated 19 July 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that Morocco hosted the Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development on 10 and 11 July 2006 in Rabat.

Nearly 80 ministers, representing 57 African and European countries participated in the Conference. Observer States, international and regional organizations, representatives of the private sector and of civil society and non-governmental organizations also took part.

The Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development, the first of its kind between the two continents, adopted a plan of action and a political declaration on migration and development, copies of which are attached (see annexes).

I would be grateful if you could arrange for the text of this letter and its annexes to be issued as an official document of the General Assembly at its sixty-first session for consideration within the framework of the High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development and of the deliberations of the General Assembly on this issue.

(*Signed*) Hamid **Chabar**
Ambassador
Deputy Permanent Representative

* A/61/150.

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Annex I to the letter dated 19 July 2006 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of Morocco the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Plan of action

The Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development should result in the adoption of concrete measures along migration routes in the short and medium term, bearing in mind that the process is ongoing. Only a pragmatic and ambitious plan of action commensurate with the magnitude of the migration phenomenon can provide an appropriate response.

It is important to take swift and tangible actions in order to respond to the urgency of the situation and to lend visibility and credibility to the new dynamic that has emerged from the Conference. In order to be effective, those measures should be based on ownership, compliance and the partnership forged between the countries and partners that participated in the Conference. In particular, the measures should guide relations between those countries in migration and development matters while taking into account the specific conditions of each country. With its cross-cutting and practical approach and partnership dimension, the dialogue on article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement is an indispensable point of reference.

This initiative is the first phase in a process envisaging the future organization of further initiatives focusing on other migration routes in Africa and Europe. Based on a continental approach, the initiative is also a key phase in the preparation of the High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, which is to take place in New York in September 2006.

Partners are invited to consider this Plan of Action within the context of their dialogue and to explore the feasibility of implementing the measures it contains. Such implementation should fully respect the dignity and fundamental rights of migrants and refugees.

1. Migration and development

Promotion of development

(a) Strengthening of economic cooperation, trade expansion, assistance with socio-economic development and conflict prevention with the aim of promoting economic prosperity in the countries concerned and thereby addressing the underlying causes of irregular migration flows;[1]

(b) Treatment of migration as a positive factor for development by promoting concrete measures to strengthen its contribution to poverty reduction,[2] and integration of these and other measures relating to migration in development policies and programmes, in cooperation with the partners concerned;

[1] Conclusions of the Seville European Council, June 2002.

[2] European Consensus on Development, December 2005.

(c) Promotion of regional integration (Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC); Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); Arab Maghreb Union (UMA)) as a means of fostering economic growth and fighting poverty;

(d) Within the framework of national and regional development approaches, identification and implementation of cooperation projects in specific employment-generating areas (agriculture, crafts, tourism, fisheries, etc.), with particular emphasis on areas with high levels of emigration, especially between countries of northern, western and central Africa;

(e) Development and intensification of tripartite cooperation between the member States of the European Union and countries of northern, western and central Africa;

(f) Technical assistance for migrants wishing to develop business projects in their countries of origin, particularly within the framework of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise (CDE), which is operated jointly by the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States;

(g) In collaboration with banks, credit unions and money transfer operators, reduction of the costs to emigrants of transferring savings to their countries of origin, while respecting the confidentiality of such transactions and strengthening their potential for development, thus rendering them more profitable;

(h) Support for the creation of a Euro-African trade and economic forum with a view to encouraging the sharing of knowledge and resources and jointly addressing needs relating specifically to the development of small and medium enterprises (SME) and African exports;

(i) Support for the creation of a network of European and African skills relating to various disciplines with the aim of advancing Africa's social and economic development;

(j) Support for the establishment of European and African partnerships between towns and cities, municipalities, companies and industries;

(k) Support for non-governmental organizations whose work relates to the co-development of African countries, particularly in areas where migration levels are high;

(l) Extension of co-development projects to cover all migration routes, drawing on the experiences of Morocco, Mali and Senegal and other countries in order to establish a network that is as comprehensive as possible and to facilitate joint actions that focus on specific issues and geographical areas.

Consideration of the creation of financial instruments that facilitate co-development

(a) Support for the creation of financial mechanisms to benefit legal migrants in Europe with the aim of co-financing their investment projects in their countries of origin or providing them with guarantees, where appropriate in collaboration with local authorities;

(b) Support for the establishment of joint financing mechanisms in the countries concerned, with the participation of migrants in host countries;

(c) Participation in response funds that support local development in areas severely affected by rural exodus.

Development of knowledge and know-how and measures to ensure that sufficient skills are available for the development of African countries

(a) Facilitation of professional training by broadening access of African students to African and European universities, institutes and higher education schools;

(b) Identification of measures to prevent the "brain drain" and to facilitate the return of highly qualified individuals to their countries of origin on completion of their studies;

(c) Creation of incentives for African students to return to their home countries, combined with a policy to encourage applications to European and African universities, particularly through the creation of regional centres of excellence in the south and support for existing centres;

(d) Conclusion of exchange agreements enabling young professionals to perfect their language and professional skills and gain paid work experience in another country, and identification of measures to ensure that such migrants return to their countries of origin at the end of their stay;

(e) Facilitation of access to new information and communications technologies;

(f) Development of twinning arrangements and partnerships with European and northern, western and central African countries with a view to financing and increasing the availability of training courses for teachers and trainers.

Development of partnerships between scientific and technical institutions

(a) Facilitation of access of researchers to scientific networks;

(b) Development of job-sharing systems for African scientists, researchers, physicians, technicians or other professionals;

(c) Facilitation of networking between researchers working in the European Union and their colleagues in Africa, primarily those working in areas of direct relevance to countries on the African continent and their research institutions.

Strengthening of cooperation on training

(a) Expansion of the range of university and technical courses offered, according to the private sector needs of African and European markets;

(b) Creation or strengthening of centres of excellence, business training centres and support structures for enterprise development, particularly within the framework of the EU-ACP Centre for the Development of Enterprise;

(c) Development of institutional twinning and partnerships between schools, universities, hospitals and research centres in northern, western and central Africa and in Europe;

(d) Facilitation of student mobility within Africa and between Africa and Europe, particularly through the Nyerere and Nyerere/Erasmus Mundus programmes.

2. Legal migration

Establishment of cooperation programmes to manage legal migration

(a) Strengthening of the administrative services (human resources and judicial, institutional and statistical infrastructures) responsible for emigration in order to permit them, among other things, to provide information to potential emigrants on available channels for legal migration;

(b) Opportunities for emigrants to receive training in their country of origin prior to departure, to facilitate insertion into the host country, as well as access to general knowledge on the values and language of the host country and the rights and duties of emigrants;

(c) Support of reception facilities for migrants in countries of destination in order to promote their integration process (language courses, orientation courses, etc. ...);

(d) Promotion of access by legal immigrants to education and training opportunities in countries of destination, which will facilitate integration into society and job placement;

(e) Promotion of measures to combat discrimination;

(f) Collective thinking on the exportability of migrants' pension entitlements.

Adoption of measures facilitating the movement of workers and persons

(a) Facilitation and streamlining of legal migration procedures for skilled and unskilled workers on a bilateral and voluntary basis, taking into account the needs of labour markets in order to improve legal channels for migration;

(b) Improved information on the needs of the European and African labour markets and on how to enter the labour markets of European Union member States;

(c) Encouragement and support for the development of intermediation mechanisms with a view to the rational management of skills mobility, matching supply and demand;

(d) Discussion of simplified procedures for certain categories of people (students, researchers, businesspeople, merchants, craftspeople, artists, athletes ...);

(e) Support for the implementation of an intra-community free circulation policy for persons within subregional economic integration organizations, while providing adequate guarantees against illegal flows and human trafficking (travel documents, border control, police and customs cooperation, cooperation for the return of persons ...);

(f) Promotion of means to facilitate roundtrip and temporary migration between countries of origin and destination which take labour market needs into account;

(g) Optimization of existing labour force and employment agreements between partners.

3. Illegal immigration

Cooperation in fighting illegal immigration

(a) Cooperation on the logistics and financing of voluntary return by migrants who are in transit countries;

(b) Establishment, with respect for the dignity and fundamental rights of persons, of effective readmission systems between all the countries involved, in particular through the effective implementation of the relevant provisions of article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement, and the conclusion of readmission agreements, on the one hand, between the relevant countries of northern, western and central Africa and, on the other hand, between the European Community or one of its member States and the countries of northern, western and central Africa;

(c) Technical and logistical support in the identification of the nationality of illegal immigrants;

(d) Facilitation of the reinsertion of illegal immigrants who have returned to their country of origin;

(e) Information and awareness campaigns for potential immigrants on the risks of illegal immigration;

(f) Provision of financial resources to assist countries facing illegal immigration emergencies.

Reinforcement of national border control capacity for transit countries and countries of departure

(a) Enhancement of training for the relevant services, equipment and cross-border operational cooperation;

(b) Cooperation in order to provide the relevant countries with a digital database aimed at effectively combating illegal immigration;

(c) Cooperation with a view to establishing an early warning system based on the European model, in order to allow immediate transmission of warning signs of cases of illegal immigration and activities on the part of criminal organizations engaged in smuggling.

4. Operational police and judicial cooperation and aid to victims

(a) Reinforcement of judicial and police cooperation to combat human trafficking and illegal immigration networks;

(b) Identification and reinforcement of cooperation mechanisms and, if necessary, of joint action by countries of origin, transit and destination, including cooperation on sea and land and in the air, in order to dismantle the criminal organizations which control trafficking across national borders;

(c) Encouragement for the ratification and greater use of the mechanisms envisaged in the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (New York, United States, November 2000) and its Protocols;

(d) Implementation of the Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, Especially Women and Children (28 November 2002);

(e) Implementation of projects providing assistance to and promoting the reinsertion of victims of human trafficking.

5. **Financing**

Creation of appropriate financing mechanisms

(a) Inventory and optimization of funds and existing institutional resources, without prejudice to existing financial frameworks, and establishment, if necessary and possible, of specific, appropriate mechanisms to implement the concrete measures identified during the Conference;

(b) Financing of approved actions through:

The European Union

Partner States

Other international organizations or institutions.

6. **Institutional framework and follow-up**

(a) Establishment of a follow-up Committee to ensure correct implementation of the Plan of Action and consistency in the actions and policies of the various organizations involved (e.g., 5 + 5 ECOWAS, Euro-Med, etc.);

(b) Establishment of operational cooperation mechanisms between countries of origin, transit and destination;

(c) Support for the creation of a Euro-African migration observatory to achieve better knowledge and better control of migration flows, and to respond as well as possible to the challenges of managing illegal migration flows and preventing the various types of trafficking associated with migration issues;

(d) Provisions for evaluation clauses to ascertain whether the financial assistance or cooperation provided complies with the obligations and commitments made by all parties;

(e) Creation, when necessary, of specialized technical units to examine certain specific aspects.

Annex II to the letter dated 19 July 2006 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of Morocco the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Euro-African Partnership for Migration and Development

Rabat Declaration

We, Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Ministers responsible for migration and development and other representatives of partner countries, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Finland, France, Gabon, the Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liberia, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, the Netherlands, the Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia, and the United Kingdom, as well as the European Commission

Having met, at the invitation of the Kingdom of Morocco, on 10 and 11 July 2006 in Rabat, within the framework of the Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development,

Expressing appreciation to the Kingdom of Morocco, as host county, for the excellent organization of the Conference and for its hospitality, as well as for its active participation and joint initiative with Spain and France,

Expressing gratitude to the Republic of Senegal for its active involvement, in particular for the excellent organization of preparatory meetings in Dakar,

Expressing appreciation to all the countries which have contributed to the drafting of the Plan of Action and of the Final Declaration,

Also expressing appreciation to the regional and international organizations in attendance at the Conference,

Aware that the futures of our countries are linked and that only the development of effective, swift and tangible solidarity reconciling the requirements of development and of security for all can provide a lasting solution to the issue of managing migration flows,

Convinced that international migration has a positive effect on host countries and countries of transit and origin when such flows are well managed,

Aware that the management of migration flows cannot be achieved by control measures alone, but also requires concerted action on the root causes of migration, in particular through the implementation of development projects in Africa,

Affirming that illegal migration, migrant smuggling and human trafficking must be combated effectively within the framework of a viable and united partnership respecting the fundamental rights and dignity of migrants,

Aware of the need to provide adequate international protection in accordance with the international obligations of the partner countries,

Aware of the need to make better use of the potential of migration as a factor for development, modernization and innovation in societies of origin and host societies,

Convinced that migration flows are prompted by powerful structural factors existing in societies of origin, transit and destination and that they have predominantly economic and social causes,

Concerned by the phenomenon of brain drain, which hinders the development of countries of origin by depriving them of skilled professionals, decision makers and experienced managers,

Reaffirming that the management of these flows requires a coherent response that addresses in a comprehensive and balanced way the different aspects and various phases of the migration process as a whole in the context of an approach involving countries of origin, transit and destination,

Undertake to create and develop a close partnership between our respective countries so as to work together, taking a comprehensive, balanced, pragmatic and operational approach, and respecting the fundamental rights and dignity of migrants and refugees, on the question of migration routes that affects our peoples:

(a) This partnership between the countries of origin, transit and destination is intended to address the fundamental issue of controlling migration flows in a specific and appropriate manner and is based on the strong conviction that migration between Africa and Europe must be managed within the context of a partnership to combat poverty and promote sustainable development and co-development;

(b) Fostering an environment conducive to development requires good governance, exchange of people and trade, promotion of peace and stability and consistent international policies;

(c) The partnership instituted by this Declaration is aimed at managing migration flows between countries of origin, transit and destination in an optimal manner and in a spirit of shared responsibility;

(d) In addition to structural development issues, this partnership will also address migration from all perspectives deemed relevant by the partner countries, including:

Utilizing the potential of legal migration and its development benefits for countries of origin and transit and host countries;

Capacity-building in countries of origin, transit and destination to manage overall migration flows;

Developing awareness campaigns;

Facilitating the movement of workers and people;

Implementing an active policy of integration of legal migrants and combating exclusion, xenophobia and racism;

Monitoring borders;

Combating illegal migration, including readmission of illegal migrants and human trafficking;

(e) This partnership will be pragmatic and operational, as is shown by the specific reflection of all these elements in the Plan of Action which was agreed to by all the participants and which is annexed to this Declaration.

Undertake, fully aware of our responsibilities with respect to cooperation for development and cooperation for the management of migratory flows, given the urgency of the situation, to begin to incorporate measures consistent with the Plan of Action in our policies and actions in these areas, while preserving its comprehensive and balanced nature;

In this regard, we request our senior officials to hold a follow-up meeting to make an initial assessment of the implementation of the Plan of Action and to propose a date for a second Ministerial Conference within the next two years;

Undertake to encourage and intensify the political and operational dialogue between the European Union and Africa on migration and development by:

(a) Deepening continent-wide political dialogue and holding an Africa-Europe ministerial conference on migration and development based on the model of the Africa-Europe Summit held at Cairo on 3 and 4 April 2000. In this respect, we welcome the offer by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to host this Conference in Tripoli before the end of 2006 as a contribution towards a joint strategy and to the second Africa-Europe Summit, which should take place in Lisbon as soon as possible;

(b) Encouraging the relevant countries and organizations in Africa and Europe, in the light of the link existing between migration routes, to abide by the concepts of the Rabat Conference;

(c) Intensifying bilateral dialogue on migration issues between the various countries of origin and transit and the European Union and its member States, including within the framework of article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement;

Invite regional and international organizations, given the importance of their role in following up and implementing the Plan of Action, to assist and support the participating States in establishing and implementing the Plan of Action, especially its development dimension;

Plan to present, within the framework of the United Nations High-Level Dialogue, the approach, conclusions and Plan of Action of this Conference as a pragmatic and operational contribution to the task of addressing together the management of migration flows.

Adopted at Rabat on 11 July 2006.

United Nations A/61/171

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Sixty-first session
Item 87 (v) of the provisional agenda*
General and complete disarmament

Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction

Report of the Secretary-General

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I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 60/78, entitled "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction", the General Assembly urged all Member States to take and strengthen national measures, as appropriate, to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture, and invited them to inform the Secretary-General, on a voluntary basis, of the measures taken in that regard. The Assembly further requested the Secretary-General to compile a report on measures already taken by international organizations on issues relating to the linkage between the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to seek the views of Member States on additional relevant measures for tackling the global threat posed by the acquisition by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction, and to report to the Assembly at its sixty-first session. The present report is submitted in response to that request.

2. By a note verbale dated 20 February 2006, Member States were invited to inform the Secretary-General of the measures taken and to communicate their views on the issue. On 20 February, letters were also dispatched to relevant international organizations, including relevant bodies and agencies of the United Nations, inviting them to submit contributions for the preparation of the report of the Secretary-General. Organizations that had reported their relevant activities in 2005 were invited to submit only new information in relation to what they had previously submitted.

3. As at 18 July 2006, replies had been received from Argentina, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, El Salvador, Georgia, Latvia, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritius, Panama, the Sudan, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. Their replies are reproduced in section II of the present report. Replies were also received from 11 international organizations; their replies are summarized in section III of the present report. Any further replies received will be issued as addenda to the present report.

II. Replies received from Member States

Argentina

[Original: Spanish]
[15 June 2006]

Argentina continues to support a committed policy to combat non-proliferation and terrorism, and over the course of the past year has strengthened that commitment.

In September 2005 Argentina signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

That same month, Buenos Aires hosted a seminar entitled "Moving towards Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)" for all the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, organized together with the United Kingdom with the aim of promoting implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). The seminar was the first opportunity for the Committee established

pursuant to that resolution to make contact with representatives from an entire region.

- In keeping with paragraph 10 of resolution 1540 (2004), Argentina announced its decision in March 2005 to work on the principles of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in cases where particular PSI activities required its support.

- In December 2005, Argentina submitted its second report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

- In April 2006 the Scientific and Technical Research Institute of the Armed Forces developed and launched a domestic outreach programme under which it gives presentations to universities, research laboratories, academic centres and industry in general in order to inform them of the commitments Argentina has undertaken concerning non-proliferation of chemical and biological weapons and related materials and of the scope of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) in that area.

- With regard to paragraph 3 (c) of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), the Nuclear Regulatory Authority continues to give courses on the prevention of illicit trafficking in nuclear radioactive material to customs officials, the security forces (Gendarmerie, Coastguard, Aeronautical Police), the intelligence community and customs officials of neighbouring countries.

- Argentina welcomes the adoption of Security Council resolution 1673 (2006) of 27 April 2006 extending the mandate of the 1540 Committee.

Bolivia

[Original: Spanish]
[8 June 2006]

The United Nations General Assembly, in its resolution 60/78, adopted on 8 December 2005, reaffirms the importance of having all Member States support international efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

Combating terrorism has become a major priority, not only in debate in international, regional and subregional forums, but also on bilateral agendas, since the international community is well aware that it must make concerted efforts to combat the perpetrators and instigators of the new modes of terrorist violence.

Bolivia's position of condemning and combating terrorism is in keeping with its foreign policy, which rejects any act of irrational terrorist violence that attacks the fundamental human rights of individuals, undermines democracy and infringes principles and norms that govern international relations.

Protective measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction must be taken at the local, regional, hemispheric and global levels.

At the United Nations, Bolivia supports the work being done by the Counter-Terrorism Committee to institute measures to prevent and suppress terrorism.

At the regional level, Bolivia is a party to the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism, which it signed in 2002 and which is now before Congress for approval.

Within subregional organizations such as the Andean Community or the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), Bolivia is helping to coordinate initiatives to analyse the root causes of contemporary terrorism and its links to poverty, drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking and the illicit circulation of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially lethal materials, so that the States concerned can effectively and in concert provide mutual assistance in preventing terrorism in all its forms and the judicial cooperation that is so important, realizing that the international scope of terrorism has exceeded the individual capacity of any State to deal with it.

Bolivia endorses the invitation to States to consider signing and ratifying the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, in order to bring about its early entry into force.

Bolivia also supports all measures taken to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture.

Canada

[Original: English]
[16 May 2006]

- Canada has a comprehensive legislative and regulatory framework to help prevent non-State actors, including terrorists, from accessing weapons of mass destruction and related materials. Details can be found in Canada's reports to the United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004).

- Canada has a comprehensive export control system, which ensures that transfers of controlled goods and technologies are not diverted to weapons of mass destruction programmes or delivery systems. Canada is an active member in all multilateral export control regimes.

- As Canada's national security is closely affected by events beyond our borders, Canada was a leader in launching the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, aimed at preventing terrorists and countries of proliferation concern from acquiring weapons and materials of mass destruction and related know-how. Canada has committed up to C$ 1 billion over 10 years, and is actively engaged in nuclear submarine dismantlement, the construction of chemical weapons destruction facilities, promoting nuclear and radiological security, the redirection of former weapons scientists and biological non-proliferation, through projects in the Russian Federation and the former Soviet Union. Canada is a major donor to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Fund, which strengthens nuclear and radiological security internationally.

- Canada is an active participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative, which aims to help prevent trafficking in weapons of mass destruction and related material, as well as their means of delivery. The Initiative can be regarded as

an integral part of implementation of operative paragraph 10 of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

- Canada made important contributions to the successful diplomatic conferences to amend the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) in July 2005, and the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation in October 2005 (Canada is currently undertaking the necessary process for ratification of these amendments).

- Canada's *Nuclear Security Regulations*, pursuant to the Nuclear Safety and Control Act, have been amended and will be promulgated in the summer of 2006. Those amendments incorporate and reflect the principles outlined in the CPPNM amendment.

- Canada signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism when it opened in September 2005, and is working towards ratification of this Convention.

- As a Participating Government of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Canada has actively pursued amendments to strengthen the NSG Guidelines. Canada is also a member of the Zangger Committee, the role of which is to interpret States' obligations pursuant to article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

- Canada has affirmed its commitment to the objectives of the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, and has indicated that it will work towards full implementation of the provisions of the Code, including the associated guidance on import and export controls of radioactive sources. As part of this commitment, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission implemented in January 2006 a sealed source tracking system as part of its National Sealed Source Registry, designed to track high risk radioactive sources from cradle to grave. In December 2005, Canada funded a successful IAEA workshop on the implementation of the IAEA code of conduct for the Russian-speaking region.

- In 2004, the Canadian Parliament passed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Implementation Act (BTWCIA). This measure will function to make it more difficult for terrorists to acquire and/or use biological weapons. The BTWCIA is framework legislation, streamlining existing laws which deal peripherally with biological weapons issues, providing a more complete legal basis for the regulation of dual-use biological agents, and establishing stricter penalties for contraventions of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

- Canada prevents acquisition by terrorists of chemicals that could be used in weapons of mass destruction by its strict licensing requirements. In this manner, licences are required for the production, use, acquisition and stockpiling of Schedule 1 chemicals. For the transfer, production and use of Schedule 2 chemicals, declarations are required.

- In 2005, the Government of Canada released its chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) strategy. The strategy focuses on prevention and mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery from CBRN terrorist

events and include provisions to keep CBRN-related materials out of the possession of terrorists.

- In January 2004, the Government of Canada established the National Risk Assessment Centre (NRAC) within the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA). NRAC increases Canada's ability to detect and stop the movement of high-risk people and goods into the country.
- CBSA is implementing a radiation detection programme at Canada's busiest ports to screen all marine containers for illicit radioactive material.

Chile

[Original: Spanish]
[1 June 2006]

Chile believes that Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on weapons of mass destruction, non-State actors and terrorism has provided a sufficient incentive for the implementation and observance of the international instruments on weapons of mass destruction.

Chile continued to participate in the negotiations on the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Navigation being conducted under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization, and supported the amendments to it.

Chile has also maintained a special interest in the establishment of an international standards regime for the multilateral regulation of the transport of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive wastes by sea.

Chile has ratified the 12 international conventions on terrorism and the existing protocols thereto. It has also signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, opened for signature on 14 September 2005, and has started the process for its ratification by Parliament.

The Customs Service of Chile has systems of control that are largely in compliance with international requirements, namely:

- It has goods-screening systems based on the risk-management method;
- It has a national screening centre under its Intelligence Department;
- Customs documents are generally transmitted electronically before the goods pass through the primary zones so that risk assessments can be made;
- The principles of data analysis, intelligence generation and local, national and international cooperation are respected;
- It works jointly and regularly with the national authorities and the ministries dealing with non-proliferation and disarmament, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

El Salvador

[Original: Spanish]
[12 April 2006]

The Government of the Republic of El Salvador, aware that the acquisition by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction poses a serious danger to humanity, has adopted a series of measures designed to prevent such acquisition. They are as follows:

1. *Decides* that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery;

The provisions of the Act on Regulations and Control of Weapons, Ammunition, Explosives and Similar Articles prohibit and penalize these activities. Specifically, article 58 forbids natural or legal persons to manufacture, import, export, trade, possess or bear:

(a) Chemical, biological or radioactive weapons or substances or materials for their production;

(b) Devices for firing weapons covertly;

(c) Ammunition poisoned with chemical or natural substances;

(d) Weapons of war;

(e) Weapons that belong to or are part of the equipment of the Armed Forces or the National Civil Police.

Article 64 of the Act forbids any natural or legal person to trade, manufacture, export, import, possess or bear military-grade explosives.

Articles 78 and 79 provide that the firearms, explosives, ammunition and accessories prohibited under the Act must be handed over to the Ministry of Defence.

3. *Decides also* that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials and to this end shall:

(a) Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, storage or transport;

(b) Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures;

(c) Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in such items in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law;

(d) Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export and trans-shipment controls over such items, including appropriate laws and regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export and controls on providing funds and services related to such export and trans-shipment such as

financing, and transporting that would contribute to proliferation, as well as establishing end-user controls; and establishing and enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export control laws and regulations.

The Act on Regulation and Control of Weapons, Ammunition, Explosives and Similar Articles, in addition to providing for the controls and prohibitions established in articles 58, 64, 78 and 79, provides, in articles 65 and 66, that natural and legal persons authorized to trade in detonators, explosives, initiators or high explosives for civilian use, whether or not they contain nitroglycerine, must notify the Ministry of Defence in writing of any transactions involving these materials, specifying to whom they are sold, in what quantity, the purpose for which they will be used and the place where they will be used.

The Act also provides that any natural or legal person, in order to use any type of explosive, must request the Ministry of Defence to provide two experts in this field to verify that the explosives are used appropriately and safely and to certify the quantity of explosives and the place where they are detonated. Both the company and the experts must report this information in writing to the Ministry of Defence, with a copy to the National Civil Police.

Title VII of the Act establishes related control and regulation measures.[1]

Georgia

[Original: English]
[11 May 2006]

Georgia supports international efforts and takes and strengthens national measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture.

In accordance with article 3, paragraph 2, of the law of Georgia on civil security service and Georgian international treaties and agreements and legislation, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia cooperates with the corresponding services of other countries in combating terrorism.

The Criminal Code of Georgia on the prevention of terrorist acts envisages a number of articles, in particular article 67, "Terrorist Act", article 68, "Terrorist act against a national of foreign State", article 90, "Non-declaration of treason", article 90 (1), "Concealment of treason", article 133, "Kidnapping or illegal deprivation of freedom", article 133 (1), "Taking hostages" and article 206, "Non-declaration of crime".

Georgian law on controls on export and import of armaments, military equipment and goods of dual-purpose use according to international and Georgian national security interests and enforcement of regimes on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction defines fundamentals and rules of control on armaments, military equipment, raw materials, tools, technologies, scientific-technical information and the import and export of services connected to their production and use.

[1] Additional information on title VII of the Act is available in the Department for Disarmament Affairs for review, upon request.

According to the law, export and import control constitutes the complex of activities the purpose of which is the prevention, revelation and elimination by the State bodies of violations of rules of production of items under export and import control, as well as of export, import, re-export and transit, stated by this law, other laws and normative acts.

The main principles of export and import control are:

(a) Exercise of international obligations undertaken by Georgia regarding the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other weapons;

(b) Prioritizing of political interests during the implementation of import and export control;

(c) Verification of final uses of the production under import and export control in the context of non-proliferation regimes;

(d) Accessibility of legal information on export and import control.

According to the law, the following products come under export and import control:

(a) Conventional armaments and techniques, raw materials, materials, special equipment and technology, as well as services connected with their production;

(b) Nuclear materials, technologies, equipment, tools, special non-nuclear materials, goods of dual use, equipment, technologies, sources of radiation and isotopic production, the list of which has been adopted by international regimes of non-proliferation;

(c) Chemicals and technologies of dual use, which could be used for chemical weapons according to the list adopted by international regimes of non-proliferation;

(d) Pathogens, their genetic variation, forms and fragments of genetic materials, which could be used for bacteriological (biological) and toxic weapons according to the list adopted by the international regimes of non-proliferation;

(e) Equipment, materials and technologies used for rocket weapons, according to the list adopted by the international regimes of non-proliferation;

(f) Scientific-technical information, services and summary of intellectual properties linked to military goods;

(g) Other products, stated by decision of the President of Georgia.

At the same time, Georgia is a party to a number of bilateral and international agreements or treaties and international conventions, the provisions of which envisage the prevention of terrorism and mutual assistance of States.[2]

[2] A list of such agreements, treaties and conventions is available in the Department for Disarmament Affairs for review, upon request.

atvia

[Original: English]
[31 May 2006]

On 16 September 2005, during the sixtieth session of the General Assembly, atvia signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear errorism. The Convention will be ratified in due time.

The amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials adopted in July 2005, are in the process of being ratified.

On 29 April 1998, the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia accepted he Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection.

The Criminal law of the Republic of Latvia incorporates legal provision for the uppression of terrorism. On 8 December 2005, amendments to the Section 88 of the riminal law, with a more precise definition of terrorism, were adopted. The riminal law defines terrorism as acts committed with the purpose of intimidating he population or to induce a country, its institutions or international organizations o undertake any action or to refrain therefrom, or to harm interests of said country, ts population or international organizations. The maximum applicable sentence for errorism, in accordance with Section 88, is life imprisonment with confiscation of roperty.

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

[Original: Arabic]
[2 May 2006]

- The Great Jamahiriya has for many years attached great importance to the question of combating terrorism. As early as 1992 it officially requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to hold a special session of the General Assembly to study the phenomenon of international terrorism, to reach a clear, agreed-upon definition of that phenomenon, and to learn of its causes and ways of dealing with it without interfering with the right of peoples to self-defence and their inalienable right of self-determination, guaranteed by international law and international covenants. The Great Jamahiriya has reiterated that request at every opportunity, in a variety of international venues.

- Since the adoption of the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on counter-terrorism, the Great Jamahiriya has wholeheartedly implemented their provisions. It has acceded to all the related international and regional conventions and concluded a number of bilateral agreements with various States on the subject. It has striven to bring its national legislation into harmony with the requirements of the relevant Security Council resolutions, passing Law No. 2 of 2005 on the suppression of money-laundering and Law No. 1 of 2005 on the reorganization of the banking, monetary and credit sectors. Moreover, it has a new draft Criminal Code that criminalizes terrorist acts and imposes stiff penalties on the perpetrators of such acts, to serve as deterrents. In addition, it has issued a number of circulars and directives on the control of movements into and out of the Great Jamahiriya and tightened controls at air, sea and land entry/exit points and border controls for the

monitoring of the movement of individuals and goods across borders. In this connection, there exists effective coordination with both Egypt and Tunisia, exercised through joint administrative and security committees established on the basis of bilateral cooperation agreements with each of those neighbouring States.

- With regard to the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), on the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as their means of delivery, the Great Jamahiriya has submitted its national report to the Committee established pursuant to that resolution and has also provided the Committee with a subsequent report containing replies to the queries raised by the Committee in connection with the contents of the national report. Coordination is currently taking place with countries that possess experience and advanced capabilities in the field of control of exports and heightened control of land, sea and air entry/exit points with a view to providing the Great Jamahiriya with what it needs in terms of both sophisticated equipment and training for Libyan personnel, so as to assist it in properly implementing the provisions of said resolution.

- A Libyan delegation took part in two workshops on control of exports and implementation of export controls held in London from 5 to 9 and from 12 to 16 September 2005.

- With regard to the systems of control over exports in place in Libya, it should be mentioned that Libya has begun to study and revise its laws on the control of exports by means of specialized committees representing all the relevant sectors with a view to developing and appropriately amending them and also to passing new legislation within the framework of the fulfilment of international commitments stipulated in the relevant international conventions and resolutions. For example, the national committee charged with follow-up of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) is working on the preparation of a draft law on the control of exports and transit, especially with regard to dual-use materials and rocket technology, so as to ensure that such materials do not get into the hands of terrorists.

Mauritius

[Original: English]
[20 June 2006]

In compliance with General Assembly resolution 60/78, the national legal framework has been strengthened by the enactment of the "Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002". Moreover, Mauritius law enforcement capability is being enhanced through professional training provided by friendly countries on a regular basis.

Panama

[Original: Spanish]
[25 May 2006]

The State of Panama supports international efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

We are cognizant of the threat of terrorism and the danger of the potential acquisition by terrorist groups of weapons of mass destruction and hence have been strengthening the analytical and operational units responsible for combating terrorism in the various bodies charged with State security.

Sudan

[Original: Arabic]
[31 May 2006]

- Stepping up media awareness campaigns on all levels using a variety of techniques to elucidate the wrongness and danger of using biological weapons;
- Focusing on combating the threat of biological terrorism by developing new ways and means of biological defence, by which is meant a strategy to counter biological threats against the security of biological materials;
- Recommending the installation of early warning equipment for environmental sampling, known as biological monitoring, which makes possible early detection of a biological weapons attack and which international parties must help States acquire;
- Accelerating research and development on antidotes by global health agencies, and ensuring the availability of the financial resources necessary to defray the cost of second-generation antidotes;
- Increasing research and development on biological control and expanding the global strategic stock of drugs for treating victims of biological attacks;
- Training a number of first responders (such as firemen, medical personnel, police, the army, and security services) to recognize and treat symptoms of the impact of biological weapons;
- Developing a global centre for the study of biological weapons and antidotes, and developing forensic medicine to improve the detection of biological crimes;
- Constructive cooperation and exchange of security and scientific information between all official State agencies and all other States for the purpose of identifying biological weapons and ways of combating them;
- Encouraging States to comply fully with existing international standards for combating biological weapons;
- Working to open direct channels of communication among States on the regional and international levels for the exchange of information and experiences between the competent national agencies of those States and relevant international and regional organizations in combating biological weapons through the establishment of a global network for such information;
- Supplying new tools to improve antidotes that provide effective protection against chemical weapons attacks.

Turkey

[Original: English]
[3 April 2006]

Turkey sincerely desires to see all countries share the goals of non-proliferation and work collectively towards a safer and more stable world.

Turkey does not possess any weapons of mass destruction and has no intention to develop programmes for acquiring weapons of this kind. Turkey takes a firm stance against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The basic precept in Turkey's armament and export policies is zero tolerance for proliferation.

Turkey does not provide any form of support and/or assistance to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transfer or use weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and fully supports all international efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Since Turkey is situated close to regions posing high risks of proliferation, it monitors with vigilance the developments in this field and takes part in collective efforts aimed at devising measures to reverse this alarming trend. Turkey attaches great importance to arms control, non-proliferation treaties and export control regimes as means to prevent such proliferation.

In this context, Turkey became party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1979, the Comprehensive-Test-Ban Treaty in 1999, the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, the Biological Weapons Convention in 1974 and the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in 1986. Turkey was a founding country of the Wassenaar Arrangement on export controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-use Goods and Technologies. Turkey joined the Missile Technology Control Regime in 1997, the Zangger Committee in 1999, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Australia Group in 2000.

In line with its general stance against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Turkey has declared its support for the Proliferation Security Initiative. The initiative builds on wider efforts by the international community to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including through existing treaties and regimes.

Turkey has also welcomed Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), and attaches great importance to its implementation, regarding the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery. Turkey has already provided the Committee with the relevant national implementation reports, which were published as Security Council documents on 1 November 2004 and 16 January 2006. These documents contain detailed information regarding national measures that are also related to preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

United Arab Emirates

[Original: English]
[14 June 2006]

The United Arab Emirates has taken the following measures towards the implementation of General Assembly resolution 60/78:

- Strengthening the control of the national coastguard over maritime and land boundaries in collaboration with the concerned security organizations in the United Arab Emirates in order to control infiltration and smuggling
- Regular inspections of weapons, ammunitions and explosives within Armed Forces units and military shooting ranges, and during the processes of transportation and storage of such weapons
- Subjecting Armed Forces officers to careful investigations and security interrogations before and after recruitment
- Regular inspection of persons dealing with these materials, in order to ensure their integrity and the sound use of these materials
- Coordinating actions with other security organizations in the country on a regular basis, in order to ensure that prompt actions are taken whenever necessary

III. Information received from international organizations

4. The summaries in the present section, describing measures taken by international organizations on issues relating to the linkage between the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, are based on the replies received from the respective organizations. Full versions of the inputs are available from the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat.

A. United Nations system

International Atomic Energy Agency

5. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continued to implement its three-year nuclear security plan of activities. The overall goal of the Agency's nuclear security activities is to assist member States, upon request, in improving their nuclear security.

6. The results obtained and experiences gained during the three-year period included increased awareness in States of the importance of establishing an infrastructure, including regulatory systems, in support of nuclear security, improved preparedness in States to address the risk of malicious acts, increased legal commitments, more States joining the Illicit Trafficking Data Base, enhanced capacity of member States to address nuclear security issues through training and education activities held in all regions and reaching some 1,500 participants, and enhanced radiation monitoring established at borders.

7. Implementation of the plan of activities has involved extensive coordination within the Agency to ensure effective, consistent and coherent programme

implementation. The Technical Cooperation Programme has provided a mechanism for the delivery of some nuclear security activities within member States. While the plan of activities constitutes the programmatic context for the Agency's nuclear security activities, projects established within the Technical Cooperation Programme provide training courses and, in some cases, technical assistance.

8. In the area of international cooperation, the Agency interacts on a regular basis with those States providing financial and in-kind contributions to the implementation of the nuclear security plan. The Agency intends to further strengthen the bilateral interaction with these donor States. The Agency continued to collaborate with other regional and international organizations in the implementation of its activities under the nuclear security plan of activities.

9. Recent developments have resulted in new international instruments that are relevant for nuclear security. The Agency's current activities complement the Code of Conduct for the Safety and Security of Radioactive Resources, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and United Nations Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1373 (2001).

10. A nuclear security plan for 2006-2009 has been developed following extensive consultations with member States. An open-ended meeting took place on 21 June 2005, at which a first draft of the plan was presented and discussed. A revised plan was prepared and an informal consultation held on 2 August 2005. The primary objective of the nuclear security plan for 2006-2009, estimated to cost $15.5 million annually, is to provide assistance to member States, upon request, in their efforts to establish, maintain and sustain effective national nuclear security frameworks.

11. The impetus for the 2006-2009 nuclear security plan was a sustained process of consultation on the implementation of the nuclear security plan of activities that has taken place with recipient countries, donors, programme delivery partners from within and outside the Agency and international and regional organizations since 2002. The findings of the International Conference on Nuclear Security held in the United Kingdom in March 2005 and the International Conference on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources convened in France in June 2005 also provided key elements to the nuclear security plan for 2006-2009.

12. The 2006-2009 nuclear security plan will consist of a simplified structure emphasizing efficiency and flexibility in order to facilitate appropriate responses to emerging priorities and changing events. Its major activities will encompass: (a) needs assessment, analysis and coordination; (b) prevention; and (c) detection and response. Activities in the Agency's nuclear safety and safeguards programmes are also recognized for their contribution to nuclear security. Activities in the safeguards programme that support nuclear security focus on effective State systems of accounting for the control of nuclear material.

International Civil Aviation Organization

[Original: English]
[13 June 2006]

13. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) focuses on preventing acts of unlawful interference in civil aviation, and the Organization has no specific measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. ICAO

however, engages in various activities that relate to the fight against all acts of terrorism.

14. The ICAO Universal Security Audit Programme, launched in 2002, directly contributes to efforts to prevent international terrorism. The objective of the Programme is to promote global aviation security through the auditing of Contracting States to determine the status of the implementation of ICAO standards. As of 31 May 2006, 124 audits had been conducted. Follow-up visits began in June 2005 to evaluate progress in implementing necessary improvements identified during audits. Those visits have resulted in significant improvements in global aviation security, while sensitizing States to international requirements and ICAO standards. Furthermore, ICAO is solidifying cooperation with the United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) through regular involvement in CTC on-site visits to assess States' compliance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001).

15. The Coordinated Assistance and Development Strategy of ICAO is aimed at improving the assistance provided to States and thus at enabling them to establish and maintain viable and sustainable aviation security systems. It entails facilitating assistance through closer coordination and cooperation with donor countries, international and regional organizations and the aviation industry, promoting the development of sustainable aviation security infrastructure through regional and subregional efforts for capacity-building, and assisting States to correct aviation security deficiencies revealed through ICAO audits.

16. On 30 November 2005, the Council of ICAO adopted amendment 11 to annex 17 of the Convention on Civil Aviation concerning security measures required to safeguard civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference. Annex 17 provisions were thoroughly reviewed in order to further clarify the wording of existing standards and recommended practices.

Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

[Original: English]
[23 May 2006]

17. The Preparatory Commission shares awareness of the serious threat to world peace and security posed by the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorist groups. Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) obliges all nations to take action to ensure that non-State actors cannot develop, produce, use or trade nuclear weapons. In this regard, the international regime of nuclear non-proliferation needs to be strengthened and fully complied with. The early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) would be another practical step in this direction.

18. The CTBT, by securing an end to all nuclear explosions, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and contributes to the enhancement of international peace and security.

19. The CTBT, as part of the global non-proliferation regime, prohibits nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, and obliges States parties to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosions at any place under their jurisdiction or control. In addition, the Treaty obliges States parties to refrain from

causing, encouraging or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.

20. The Preparatory Commission, pursuant to its mandate, is making good progress building up the verification system for the CTBT. The International Monitoring System (IMS), hosted by 89 States, is rapidly taking shape. As of today, approximately 220 IMS stations have been installed.

21. The year 2006 marks the tenth anniversary of the CTBT's opening for signature, which to date has 176 signatures and 132 ratifications, including 34 of the 44 States listed in annex 2 to the CTBT, whose ratification is required for entry into force. This demonstrates significant support from the international community.

22. In this respect, the results of the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held in New York in September 2005, give momentum to the efforts to achieve the early entry into force of the CTBT and thus contribute to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

B. Other international organizations

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

[Original: English]
[15 March 2006]

23. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) held an export licensing experts meeting in Singapore in November 2005. The experts exchanged information on best practices and lessons learned regarding critical elements of effective export controls, including the licensing approving authorities, the licence application process, complementary measures, inter-agency consultation and coordination process, end-user verification checks, and risk analysis. The ARF ministerial meeting, to be held in Kuala Lumpur this month, is expected to adopt an ARF compilation of best practices in export licensing which would constitute a tool available to all ARF participants. Furthermore, the ARF Unit of the ASEAN secretariat is developing the ARD contact points for export control for effective coordination and networking purposes.

Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

[Original: English]
[13 March 2006]

24. At the nineteenth regular session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), held in Santiago in November 2005, member States adopted resolution 487, entitled "Santiago Declaration". The resolution underscored the important role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in verifying the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only and reiterated support of the fundamental role of the IAEA in the full application and verification of compliance with the international nuclear safeguards regime provided for under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It also supported IAEA efforts to

strengthen the regime and to highlight the importance of the Model Additional Protocol as the ideal instrument for making the IAEA safeguards system more efficient and effective.

25. OPANAL member States also resolved to highlight the growing threat to international security posed by the possibility that non-State actors may obtain nuclear weapons, and supported the initiatives undertaken by the IAEA to this end. Member States also declared their firm conviction that the most effective way to prevent non-State actors from accessing nuclear weapons was through the total elimination of such weapons.

European Commission

[Original: English]
[10 July 2006]

26. The European Commission has a wide range of responsibilities in areas relevant to the prevention of terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. These are as follows:

Nuclear safeguards

- Under the Euratom Treaty (chapter VII), the Commission has wide-ranging powers to control civil nuclear material produced in or imported into the European Union (EU) and to perform nuclear safeguards. The Commission manages a database containing information on all civilian nuclear materials in the European Community.
- The Community has adopted legislation concerning the transfer between States of high activity sealed radioactive sources and radioactive waste. The Community (Euratom) is a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials.

Trafficking in nuclear material

- The European Commission's Joint Research Centre currently has advanced tools to interdict illegal weapons of mass destruction cargoes.
- The Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen has developed a pre-operational capability in automatic intelligence gathering and risk analysis for containerized cargo itineraries worldwide.
- The International Telecommunication Union (ITU), together with the Directorate-General Energy and Transport (DG-TREN), participates in the International Technical Working Group on combating nuclear smuggling.
- ITU, as part of a long-standing cooperation programme with the Russian Federation, Ukraine and other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, channels considerable efforts into combating trafficking in illicit nuclear materials. This includes training police and customs officers, the implementation of model border crossings and training experts in the analysis of nuclear materials.

Proliferation Security Initiative

- The European Commission supports the Proliferation Security Initiative, which aims at the interdiction of cargoes of weapons of mass destruction and related material.

Export control/dual-use goods

- Under EU Regulation 1334, the control lists of the four dual-use regimes are brought together in a single instrument, which sets out the procedures governing EU member States with regard to the export of sensitive weapons of mass destruction-related dual-use goods from the European Union.

- The Commission works with EU member States to help advocate best practice export control procedures for sensitive goods and technologies to third States in need of assistance.

United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)

- The Commission's extensive non-proliferation capabilities are reflected in the European Union's separate report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). It, inter alia, represents the areas where a Community approach exists to respond to the issues identified in the resolution. Each EU member State report has referred to this common EU element as an integral part of their individual contribution.

Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN)

- The EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism identifies the strengthening of arrangements for the identification, control and interception of illegal trafficking in weapons of mass destruction material as one of its objectives. Work continues on ways to protect civilian populations against CBRN risks and, in this connection, the Commission is examining CBRN-related detection technologies.

Customs policy

- To reinforce the security of the international supply chain, a number of security amendments of the Community Customs Code were introduced in April 2005. The European Commission is currently working on the implementation of the security amendments for improved security checks on the flow of goods by introducing advanced cargo data requirements under the Authorized Economic Operators programme, an industry-customs partnership.

Transport security

- There have been a number of Community security initiatives — many of them in response to the terrorist threat — such as on maritime and aviation security — which set out new EU security standards in support of the EU's non-proliferation objectives.

Biosafety/Biosecurity

- The Commission currently funds biosafety and biosecurity projects in Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, in cooperation with the United States and Canada.

International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology

[Original: English]
[23 March 2006]

37. The main activity of the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB) relating to the linkage between the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has been the preparation of a code of conduct for life scientists.

38. A working paper setting forth elements of a code of conduct for life scientists was presented at the Meeting of Experts of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), convened in Geneva in June 2005. ICGEB subsequently presented these elements in a revised working paper at the meeting of States parties to the BWC, in December 2005. Some of the major points in the revised working paper are:

- In order to be valid, a code should be short, understandable, acceptable to scientists, endorsed by scientific organizations and applicable to industrial laboratories. There is, as well, a need to engage individual scientists and institutions in self-governance measures.
- It is necessary to establish a threshold for acceptable/non-acceptable research so as to avoid restrictions that would result in a limitation of research and biotechnology developments.
- The duty to avoid any possible hostile use of research must take precedence over any other commitment, including professional and military duties.

League of Arab States

[Original: Arabic]
[31 May 2006]

39. Although the Arab States do not possess weapons of mass destruction, they are involved in the efforts of the international community to prevent terrorists from gaining possession of such weapons, their means of delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture.

40. The Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism of 1998 and the Model Arab Law for Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Hazardous Substances contain provisions that criminalize the manufacture, trafficking or possession of weapons, munitions or explosives, and other items that may be used for the commission of terrorist offences (article 2, paragraph 6, of the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism) and request member States to develop and strengthen systems for the detection of the movement, import, export, stockpiling and use of weapons, munitions, explosives and other means of aggression, murder and destruction as well as procedures for monitoring their passage through customs and across borders in order to prevent their transfer from one Contracting State to another or to third

party States other than for lawful purposes and on a firm basis (article 3, paragraph 3, of the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism). These measures include all weapons, hazardous substances and means of aggression, murder and destruction, including weapons of mass destruction and their components.

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

[Original: English]
[31 May 2006]

31. A number of activities of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) contribute to the fight against terrorism. The OPCW Executive Council Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism, established on 7 December 2001 to further examine the contribution of OPCW to global anti-terrorism efforts, has held several meetings, which have included briefings by the Group and the technical secretariat on the status of OPCW contribution to global anti-terrorism efforts, national and international presentations, and briefings by the secretariat on its contacts with relevant international bodies in the field of counter-terrorism.

32. OPCW, together with the Government of Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre, conducted a major field exercise, "Joint Assistance 2005", in Lviv, Ukraine, from 9 to 13 October 2005. The exercise, requiring coordination between the secretariat, OPCW member States and international and regional organizations, was designed to test and refine international cooperation procedures to deliver emergency assistance following a simulated terrorist attack using a chemical agent.

33. The Director-General and other representatives of the secretariat, in their contacts with international organizations and bilateral consultations with senior officials from States parties, have regularly underscored the importance that OPCW attaches to counter-terrorism.

Organization of American States

[Original: English]
[17 April 2006]

34. In March 2005, Inter-American Committee against Terrorism of the Organization of American States (OAS) approved its workplan, which included measures to prevent the acquisition of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons by non-State actors, called for under OAS General Assembly resolution AG/RES. 2107 (XXXV-O/05). The resolution calls on member States to adopt, without delay, effective measures to fulfil their obligations under United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). To facilitate implementation of this resolution, the OAS plans to convene a regional meeting of key science administrators and arrange for briefings by representatives of the 1540 Committee. The OAS will organize presentations on best practices recommended by the IAEA, OPCW and organizations specializing in the biological sciences.

35. In the "Declaration of San Carlos on Hemispheric Cooperation for Comprehensive Action to Fight Terrorism", adopted by the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism in March 2006, member States of the OAS emphasized the need to become parties to the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism and the 13 international conventions and protocols related to terrorism, and to

effectively implement the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999), 1373 (2001), 1540 (2004), 1566 (2004), 1617 (2005) and 1624 (2005).

36. Member States declared their commitment to identifying and fighting emerging terrorist threats, such as cybercrime, bioterrorism, threats to tourism security and critical infrastructure. They also declared their commitment to preventing terrorist access to and use of weapons of mass destruction and related materials.

World Customs Organization

[Original: English]
[20 March 2006]

37. The terrorist events in the United States on 11 September 2001 called for an agreed strategy to prevent, among other things, terrorist abuse of the global trading system without jeopardizing the flow of trade. This realization provided the impetus for the World Customs Organization (WCO) to establish the SAFE Framework of Standards Programme in June 2005.

38. The Customs-to-Customs network arrangements and the Customs-to-Business Partnership will allow the WCO SAFE Framework to provide supply chain security and facilitation to international trade and enable integrated supply chain management for all modes of transport. The application of risk management and risk assessment techniques to make the best use of available resources, the harmonization of advance electronic cargo information to identify high risk consignments, the use of non-intrusive detection equipment for outbound inspection and cooperation with business partners meeting appropriate security standards are crucial elements, which, once implemented, will give customs the tools to meet the challenges posed by transnational crime and international terrorism in the twenty-first century.

39. The universal implementation of the SAFE Framework of Standards would provide uniformity and predictability to the global trade environment by safeguarding the end-to-end security of the trade supply chain and facilitating the passage of legitimate goods. This instrument has been endorsed by the Council of the WCO, and a great majority of the WCO 169 member customs administrations, which have also formally indicated their intention to implement its provisions.

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Report of the Secretary-General

Addendum

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II. Replies received from Member States

Kyrgyzstan

[Original: English]
[23 August 2006]

1. The Kyrgyz Republic does not possess weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery.

2. Kyrgyzstan fully meets its obligations as a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In addition, on 18 March 1998, the Kyrgyz Republic signed the Agreement for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with the International Atomic Energy Agency, of which it has been a member State since 2003. The Agreement entered into force in the Republic on 3 February 2004. In the near future, Kyrgyzstan also intends to become a party to the Additional Protocol to said Agreement.

3. Kyrgyzstan is a party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

4. Kyrgyzstan also actively cooperates with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to paragraph 4 of resolution 1540 (2004) by submitting national reports on the implementation of the resolution.

5. To prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Kyrgyzstan adopted an export control act in 2002 to establish a control system for dual-purpose items, including materials that could be used to manufacture weapons of mass destruction.

6. The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism has been signed and will be ratified in the near future.

7. Kyrgyzstan cooperates bilaterally with other States to strengthen its border security and export control capabilities. In particular, cooperation with the Government of the United States of America is under way in the framework of the Export Control and Border Security Programme. The Republic is also a party to a Euro-Asian Economic Community agreement on the harmonization of export control procedures.

Philippines

[Original: English]
[23 June 2006]

The Philippines is engaged in a number of activities, the objectives of which are to enhance the security of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear facilities and related infrastructures, develop and strengthen regulations on weapons of mass destruction proliferation and chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear facilities

regulations and other legal structures and enhance operational counter-proliferation activities.

The Department of Health is strengthening the security of critical infrastructures by undertaking quarterly security assessments of hospital facilities with emphasis on building structures, laboratories, X-ray departments, utilities and human resources capabilities.

Upgrades were completed at the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (Secondary Standards Dosimetry Laboratory) on 24 February 2006.

Draft anti-terrorist legislation is currently being considered in the Upper House (Senate). The assessment and field-testing of guidelines to assess national health capacity to manage health risks of the deliberate use of biological and chemical agents was conducted in February 2005 with the assistance of the World Health Organization. A health emergency preparedness plan is currently being elaborated by the Department of Health.

Draft comprehensive nuclear legislation is currently under consideration. The International Atomic Energy Agency, which assisted the Government by reviewing this draft legislation, has also provided support in the formulation of a nuclear security programme.

To further the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Philippines is currently drafting enabling legislation and strictly monitoring chemicals controlled under that Convention. To enhance oversight of chemicals in commerce, the Government is developing the Philippine Inventory of Chemicals and Chemical Substances and an end-user list.

The Philippines cooperates with the United States in the latter's Second Line of Defense (SLD) Programme, which includes the Megaports Initiative, and international non-proliferation export control programmes. In addition, the Philippines is enhancing customs operational activities and export/import regulations.

The Government capacity-building programme on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear facilities and related weapons of mass destruction concerns includes bilateral training programmes with the United States in health emergency management, training for law enforcement in cooperation with the Australian Government and the Regional Security of Radioactive Sources project under the Global Threat Reduction Initiative funded by Australia and the United States. The Philippines has also participated in international training seminars and workshops on weapons of mass destruction and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear facilities and has organized local training on emergency medical intervention in mass casualty situations.[1]

[1] Additional information on the Government of the Philippines activities to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction is available in the Department for Disarmament Affairs for review upon request.

Syrian Arab Republic

[Original: Arabic]
[30 March 2006]

1. The Syrian Arab Republic does not possess any nuclear weapons, their means of delivery, or related materials, nor does it provide assistance to any party. Legislative decree No. 64, on radiological protection and the security and safety of radiation sources used for peaceful purposes in a variety of fields such as medicine, manufacturing, agriculture, and scientific research, was issued on 1 August 2005. This decree gives the national oversight body wide powers, stressing the need for continued monitoring of any handling of radioactive or nuclear materials, including, inter alia, the design, manufacture, import and export of radioactive sources. The provisions of this decree are consistent with international requirements regarding the need for national legislation to regulate the handling of such materials. It establishes rules and restrictions and lays down strict penalties for violations. The decree also contains provisions for responding to radiological emergencies.

Border surveillance

2. In 1987, the Syrian Arab Republic, desiring to combat illegal trafficking, established specialized border stations at all its land, sea and air entry and exit points to monitor movements of nuclear and radioactive materials, in accordance with national rules, legislation and regulations that have the force of law and comply with IAEA international norms and regulations relating, in particular, to the reporting, registration, licensing and monitoring of all radioactive and nuclear materials and equipment used for peaceful purposes that enter and exit the country.

3. The Syrian Arab Republic applies strict domestic legislation in the monitoring of all prohibited or restricted materials coming into Syria via air, land and seaports. Additionally, it has committed itself to a number of international instruments adopted under the auspices of IAEA.[1]

Nuclear terrorism

4. The Syrian Arab Republic, like all Arab States, has been a party to the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism since 1998. The Syrian Arab Republic is also a party to the Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism in 1999. In March 2005, the Syrian Arab Republic acceded to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

5. In September 2005, the Syrian Arab Republic signed the International Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. The Syrian Arab Republic was one of the first States, since 1985, to call for the convening of an international conference, under the auspices of the United Nations, to discuss the subject of terrorism and to define the meaning of the term.

[1] Details of relevant legislation enacted and of international instruments to which the Syrian Arab Republic is committed are available in the Department for Disarmament Affairs for review upon request.

Chemical materials

6. The Syrian Arab Republic does not possess any chemical weapons, their means of delivery or related materials, nor does it provide assistance to any party whatsoever for the purpose of carrying out activities in this area.

7. The Syrian Arab Republic is a party to a number of the conventions on the management of chemicals and hazardous waste.[1]

8. The Syrian Arab Republic completed a national chemical safety profile involving the adoption of a plan of action to improve the management of chemical materials.[2]

Biological materials

9. The Syrian Arab Republic does not possess any biological weapons, their means of delivery or related materials, nor does it provide assistance to any party whatsoever for the purpose of carrying out activities in this area.

10. The Syrian Arab Republic does not possess any biological materials, although there are some components that are all used for peaceful industrial or agricultural purposes. The Syrian Arab Republic has introduced a series of measures to regulate the handling of biological materials used in various applications, with a view to preventing them from falling into the hands of non-State actors.

11. With regard to the request for opinions of Member States on steps to address the global threat posed by the acquisition by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction, the Syrian Arab Republic believes that enhanced international cooperation at various regional and international levels has helped in this area. There is also a need to address the roots of terrorism and to strive for peaceful and permanent solutions to various problems whose conflagration leads to the manifestation and continuation of terrorism.

[1] A list of the related conventions to which the Syrian Arab Republic is a party is available in the Department for Disarmament Affairs for review upon request.

[2] Further details on this plan of action are available in the Department for Disarmament Affairs for review upon request.

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United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine

Note by the Secretary-General

The sixtieth report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, covering the period from 1 September 2005 to 31 August 2006, was transmitted by the Chairperson of the Commission for communication to the States Members of the United Nations in accordance with paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 512 (VI) of 26 January 1952 and paragraph 2 of Assembly resolution 60/100 of 8 December 2005. The report of the Commission is hereby transmitted to the General Assembly.

* A/61/150.

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Sixtieth report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine*

In paragraph 2 of its resolution 60/100 of 8 December 2005, the General Assembly requested the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to report to the Assembly as appropriate, but no later than 1 September 2006. The Commission recalls its report of 19 August 2005 (A/60/277) and observes that it has nothing new to report since the submission of that report.

* The present report covers the period from 1 September 2005 to 31 August 2006.